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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription

12/10/2001b6
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[redacted] born [redacted] SSAN [redacted]

phone

[redacted] number [redacted] was interviewed at [redacted] place of business. After being advised of the nature of the interview and the identity of the interviewing agent, [redacted] provided the following information.

[redacted] has a [redacted] degree in [redacted] work
with anthrax focuses on [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted] is not aware of any outside commercial sources for anthrax in general or Ames in particular. Nor does [redacted] know of any internet sources of information or "underground recipes."

[redacted]

The only current or former employee that [redacted] found to be suspicious is [redacted] knows of no others that have anthrax expertise that acted erratically or seemed to have a grudge. [redacted] did not know of any employees who were lax in their attention to safety or security practices, or of any incidents where someone had tried to acquire select agents. At the recent anthrax conference in [redacted] [redacted] did not encounter any suspicious individuals or notice any unusual incidents.

The only unusual inquiry [redacted] has had recently was [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted] also notified [redacted]

See IA (30)

Investigation on 12/03/2001 at Fort Detrick, MarylandFile # 279A-WF-222936-302 - 302 - 1478-618 Date dictated 12/09/2001

by SA [redacted] 9 [redacted] 12/10/01

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Continuation of FD-302 of

[redacted], On 12/03/2001, Page 2

Dr. BRUCE IVINS. (Note: SA [redacted] spoke with SA [redacted], WMD Coordinator, [redacted] Division. [redacted] is familiar with [redacted] and believes [redacted] will be doing anthrax research on samples provided by LSU.)

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

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b7CDate of transcription 03/04/2002

approximately [redacted] years of age, [redacted]

[redacted] was advised of the nature of the interview and the identities of the Special Agents (SAs). [redacted] provided the following information:

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

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Investigation on 2/26/2002 at Ft. Detrick, MDFile # 279A-WF-222936-TAB - 103 Date dictated 3/4/2002by SA SA



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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 04/29/2002

On 04/25/2002, Special Agents [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Washington Field Office (WFO), contacted [REDACTED]. This contact was initiated to collect information regarding reports that swabbing, which resulted in presumptive positive results, had been conducted outside the laboratory suites at United States Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID), Ft Detrick, Maryland. After the interviewing agents identified themselves and advised of the nature of the interview [REDACTED] voluntarily provided the following information:

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[REDACTED] is further described as [REDACTED]
born [REDACTED] social security number [REDACTED] home address [REDACTED], home telephone [REDACTED]-
[REDACTED], and work telephone [REDACTED] is a [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] at USAMRIID. [REDACTED] has worked in the [REDACTED]
Division with BRUCE IVINS for [REDACTED] years.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

In December 2001, IVINS [REDACTED] that he (IVINS) had swabbed [REDACTED] office because he was concerned about the previously mentioned comments made by [REDACTED]. IVINS advised that some of the samples appeared to have the presence of B.A. (presumptive positive results). [REDACTED]

In early April 2002, [REDACTED] learned that [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] had a possible contamination incident inside lab suite [REDACTED] a bio-safety level [REDACTED] lab.

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b7CInvestigation on 04/25/2002 at Ft Detrick, MarylandFile # 279A-WF-222936-302-1379SA [REDACTED]
by SA [REDACTED]

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SSA [REDACTED]

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Continuation of FD-302 of [redacted]

, On 04/25/2002, Page 2

On the following Tuesday or Wednesday, [redacted] learned that the B3 suite had been cleaned.

[redacted]

On Friday, 04/19/02, [redacted] attended the "town hall meeting" where [redacted] learned the full extent of the incident and the sampling surveys.

[redacted]

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription

11/21/2002

On November 19, 2002, [REDACTED] date of birth [REDACTED] social security account number [REDACTED] was interviewed at [REDACTED] place of employment [REDACTED] telephone [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] After being advised of the identity of the agents and the purpose of the interview, [REDACTED] provided the following information:

BRUCE IVINS and [REDACTED] did the initial *Bacillus anthracis* concentration counts on the Daschle letter in Room [REDACTED] Suite B3, Building 1425 at the United States Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID) last fall. They received the Daschle letter in a ziploc bag, and [REDACTED] did not know if the letter had been irradiated at the time they received it. [REDACTED] advised that it most likely had not been irradiated, as it would not have had any colonies present if it had been. [REDACTED] did not actually witness IVINS and [REDACTED] working on the Daschle letter, and [REDACTED] was not sure whether they had also worked on the New York Post letter.

In late spring of 2002, IVINS did some thermostability studies of *B.a.* spores at various temperatures. The spores used in these studies were maintained in a diluent prior to the study.

In early June 2002, SA [REDACTED] FBI, asked IVINS to look at spore thermostability again, but [REDACTED] wanted IVINS to start from powdered material for this study and to use Vollum 1B and Ames

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b7CInvestigation on 11/19/2002 at [REDACTED] MarylandFile # 279A-WF-222936-302-2847-302-400

Date dictated

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by SA [REDACTED]

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Continuation of FD-302 of [redacted], On 11/19/2002, Page 2

as controls. [redacted] advised that there was initially some confusion about this request, as [redacted] was not sure whether SA [redacted] wanted IVINS involved due to the independent anthrax swabbing incident that IVINS was responsible for. This issue was worked out and they proceeded using reconstituted powder that they received from [redacted]

Original material was used in the analysis of the Daschle letter, however reconstituted powder was used in the analysis of the other letters.

[redacted]

[redacted]

While employed at USAMRIID, [redacted] worked primarily in Room [redacted] of Suite [redacted] in Building [redacted]. Room [redacted] and Suite [redacted] were connected, although Suite [redacted] was shut down for renovations during the time period when the evidence was at USAMRIID.

[redacted]
[redacted] many individuals from the [redacted] Division worked in Room [redacted] at other times including:

[redacted] and [redacted]
[redacted] who worked with [redacted] IVINS.
[redacted] IVINS would put a sign on the door of the lab when they were harvesting B.a. spores so that people would knock on the door before trying to enter.

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Continuation of FD-302 of [redacted]

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Although [redacted] did most of [redacted] work in Room [redacted]
[redacted]

[redacted] The individuals from the [redacted] Division listed in the previous paragraph sometimes worked in Rooms [redacted] and [redacted] also, along with one other individual. [redacted] was not aware of anyone from the [redacted] Division that used Room [redacted]

[redacted] conducted many laboratory tasks in Room [redacted] without wearing protective gloves. [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted] If [redacted] reached into a box of protective gloves and pulled out more than [redacted] needed, [redacted] would have placed the extra gloves back in the box.

[redacted] touched the cold room door handle of Room [redacted] without gloves. All the culture media was kept in this room, as well as B.a. spores in 1% phenol. Plates that had been counted but were not ready for disposal were also kept there. [redacted] advised that many people used Room [redacted]

[redacted] passed media into Room [redacted] without wearing gloves. [redacted] also touched the autoclave controls as well as the temperature recording chart on the cold room with bare hands. [redacted] may not have worn gloves when reaching in the freezers in the [redacted] hallway where the stock cultures were kept. [redacted] advised that [redacted] would have only done this if [redacted] knew the exact location of what [redacted] was looking for.

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Continuation of FD-302 of [redacted]

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[redacted] would have touched any glassware in Room [redacted] as well as the telephone in the [redacted] hallway without wearing gloves. [redacted] would have handled the phone, computer, and facsimile machine in the office area of Suite [redacted] without gloves. [redacted] checked and flushed the eyewash and the drains in Room [redacted] and the common area of Suite [redacted] without gloves. [redacted] advised that most other people working in the laboratory and performing the same types of tasks as [redacted] did would not have worn gloves either.

[redacted] would have worn gloves any time that [redacted] worked with an organism or worked in the hood, and would have removed them when [redacted] was finished. [redacted] also would have worn gloves when [redacted] handled a dilution tube after it had been used. At the time the evidence was being examined, they were still permitted to send single sheets of paper through the pass box.

None of the individuals that [redacted] worked with shared suits, scrubs, or masks. Each person had their own mask that was kept inside of a bag in a drawer with approximately four to five other bagged masks. These masks were half face respirators that each person was fit tested for. When [redacted] first got [redacted] mask, it was new and had not been worn by anyone else. [redacted] did not wear [redacted] mask or any other respiratory protection when [redacted] worked in the hood, however [redacted] did wear [redacted] mask when [redacted] needed to open a centrifuge.

[redacted] reviewed the steps that [redacted] went through to gain access to the lab. [redacted] entered the change room through the door on the cold side and removed [redacted] clothes there. [redacted] would put [redacted] scrubs and socks on, and bouffant caps were available for those who did not want to wash their hair when they showered after exiting the hot side. [redacted] would enter [redacted] pin number and go through the airlock walkway to the hot side. This pin was necessary to gain access to the hot side of [redacted]. Once [redacted] was on the hot side, [redacted] would put shoes on, open the door to the lab and enter.

When [redacted] was finished working [redacted] removed [redacted] scrubs on the hot side where they were autoclaved and then passed back to the cold side. [redacted], a local merchant that employs mentally challenged people, would pick up the dirty scrubs and towels for laundering. Prior to 1998 or 1999, the military handled the laundering of the scrubs and towels. [redacted] did not think that the [redacted] employees had background investigations.

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Continuation of FD-302 of [redacted]

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The scrubs were previously colored according to size, but the policy changed to assigning each division its own color of scrubs. Clean scrubs were delivered to a rack in the hallway near the cold side change room and clean towels would either be left inside the change room or outside if someone was in the shower.

Prior to the anthrax swabbing incident that IVINS was responsible for, the [redacted] personnel had access to the cold side change rooms in order to pickup dirty scrubs and towels and to drop off clean ones. Their access was revoked after the swabbing incident and military personnel became responsible for picking up the clean laundry from the loading dock after it was delivered by [redacted]. In addition to the scrubs, the towels started being autoclaved before being sent out to [redacted]. [redacted] recalled that the same two men and one woman from [redacted] came to [redacted] change room for the laundry.

Although any time that [redacted] shared someone's laboratory equipment [redacted] wiped it down with a bactericidal, [redacted] could not guarantee that others did the same. [redacted] advised that this is particularly important for centrifuges. The water bath, centrifuge, and shaker were the three pieces of equipment that were shared the most in [redacted] lab. [redacted] thought that the shaker may not have been wiped down routinely. [redacted] used both the shaker and the water bath.

[redacted] did not think that anyone would have worn [redacted] suit or equipment. [redacted] did not see anyone do anything like that in Building [redacted] and the evidence was handled only in that building.

It was rumored that in addition to Suite B3, the letters were also handled in Suite [redacted] although [redacted] did not know in which rooms. It was also rumored that the letters were handled in the [redacted] hallway where the special pathogens were kept.

[redacted]
[redacted] cautioned that [redacted] sometimes embellishes stories. [redacted] advised [redacted] that [redacted] opened things where [redacted] shouldn't have and that [redacted] behavior seemed unsafe. [redacted] reportedly opened a letter in a biosafety level [redacted] laboratory located behind a clinical lab in the bathroom hallway. There is also a [redacted] clinical lab area up the hallway from that area and located near the loading dock. At that loading dock is an airlock

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door to the [redacted] clinical lab where [redacted] thought the [redacted]
[redacted]

Whenever [redacted] did a study with B.a., [redacted] therefore worked in Building [redacted] as the aerosolization set up was located there. [redacted] used Room [redacted] to spread plates, the incubator in Room [redacted] and the autoclave in Room [redacted]. Plethysmography was performed in the area between Room [redacted] and Room [redacted] on the floor plan. The aerosols were done in the hood line in Room [redacted] and were expanded into Room [redacted] during 2001 to 2002. From approximately 1997 to 1999, all aerosol challenges would have been conducted in Room [redacted] only. Room [redacted] was also being used to do Brucella work for Walter Reed Hospital.

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[redacted] would have more information on this.

The people conducting the aerosols usually wore a paper mask and gloves, as animals were being moved in and out all day long. In the hallway outside of Room [redacted] the amount of air that the animals turned over was measured prior to the aerosol challenge. Using this figure, along with the dose administered, the amount of B.a. that the animal breathed in could be calculated. There was a lot of activity on the stairway from the animal rooms to the aerosol challenge area during a spray.

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In Room [redacted] would have touched the water bath, the centrifuge, the telephone, the drawer handles, and the radio without gloves. [redacted] would have brought plates in and handled them in the cold room and would have lined up dilution tubes in a test tube rack. Room [redacted] had an incubator and a telephone. Room [redacted] was where the trash was autoclaved.

[redacted] labeled the rooms [redacted] used on the Building [redacted] floor plan for the agents. The floor plan is included in the 1A envelope. [redacted] advised that aerosol challenges could be very boring, [redacted] would often tell stories about [redacted] to pass the time.

During the time period of 1997 to 1999, the following individuals worked in the area of Room [redacted] in addition to [redacted] IVINS, [redacted] and [redacted]. In addition, [redacted] as well as personnel from any of the other divisions that requested aerosol challenges would have been in Room [redacted].

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Continuation of FD-302 of [redacted]

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[redacted]
[redacted] advised that the [redacted] Division is a social group and that there were probably some Christmas parties in the last [redacted] years that [redacted] attended. [redacted] heard that [redacted] attended a party at [redacted] house which is located near [redacted]. [redacted] was not at the party, but [redacted] was present and saw [redacted] there.

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]
[redacted] never saw [redacted] in Building [redacted] only saw [redacted] once, when [redacted] was standing near a Xerox machine. [redacted] did not know [redacted]

[redacted] works at USAMRIID in the [redacted]

[redacted]

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Date of transcription 01/14/2003


On January 7, 2003, [REDACTED] date of birth [REDACTED] social security account number [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] telephone [REDACTED] left a voice mail for SA [REDACTED] providing the following information:

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[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] advised that [REDACTED] BRUCE IVINS was with [REDACTED] for the trip to COVANCE.

[REDACTED] advised that BRUCE IVINS would have a copy of the documentation necessary for [REDACTED] to take a military vehicle to COVANCE. [REDACTED] would have driven, so the paperwork would most likely have [REDACTED] name on it.

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Investigation on 01/07/2003 at Washington, DC (telephonically)

File # 279A-WF-222936 -302-2906 437 279A-BA-C10139 Date dictated 1/14/03 N/A b6
by SA [REDACTED] b7C

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

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b7CDate of transcription 09/16/2003

On September 16, 2003, [redacted] date of birth [redacted] social security account number [redacted] was interviewed at [redacted] place of employment, [redacted] located at [redacted] telephone [redacted]. After being advised of the identity of the agents and the purpose of the interview, [redacted] provided the following information:

[redacted] has never been to the University of New Mexico.

For work in the laboratory [redacted] wore size [redacted] gloves which may have been powderless. Anyone working in Room [redacted] could have used gloves from the same box as [redacted] and others working in Suite [redacted] had the same type of gloves in their labs. There were also [redacted] gloves on a shelving unit in the hallway of [redacted] outside of the animal room. BRUCE IVINS did not wear [redacted] gloves, [redacted]

[redacted] has never entered Suite [redacted] and therefore [redacted] never touched any ziploc bags that may have been stored in the suite. [redacted] did receive a sample from [redacted] that had been in [redacted]. The sample was contained in an Eppendorf tube, wrapped in aluminum foil, and inside of a ziploc bag.

[redacted] advised that when supplies arrived for the laboratories, they were kept outside of the suites until they were moved inside. Any supplies would have been brought in through an airlock or hand carried into the suite. Ziploc bags were kept in [redacted] inside of a drawer. If [redacted] needed bags in an animal room, [redacted] would have torn some off of a roll and brought them with [redacted]. Ziploc bag sharing took place within [redacted] and [redacted] had no recollection of anyone working in [redacted] asking for ziploc bags from [redacted]. If an individual ran out of ziploc bags within a suite, it would have been more likely that they would have obtained replacements from a cold area rather than from another containment suite. [redacted] also had access to ziploc bags in Suite [redacted] laboratory space on the cold side. [redacted] did not recall ever providing anyone with ziploc bags from the supply in [redacted]

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b7CInvestigation on 09/16/2003 at [redacted] MarylandFile # 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID 279A-BA-C101392 Date dictated N/Aby SSA [redacted]
SA [redacted]27
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Continuation of FD-302 of [redacted]

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Approximately three to four times, [redacted] sent *Bacillus anthracis* (*B.a.*) spores to the United States Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID) for irradiation. IVINS' lab group was "roped" into the process since they were part of the Bacteriology Division and worked with *B.a.* After the spores had been irradiated, IVINS' lab group would retrieve them from the cold room in the warehouse off of the loading dock. To gain access to the warehouse, they had to go down the hallway near [redacted] lab. [redacted] recalled that the spores may have been in centrifuge bottles that were packaged inside of shipping containers. They would take the spores to [redacted] and attempt to grow them on plates as a sterility check. [redacted] advised that [redacted] would not have taken the [redacted] spores to be irradiated nor would [redacted] have picked them up for the sterility check after irradiation.

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IVINS may have records pertaining to the Dugway spore irradiation sterility checks. If the results for growth were negative, he may not have made a record of it. [redacted] recalled one instance when the spores had not all been killed by irradiation, and thought that IVINS may have recorded that data. This incident took place when [redacted] was employed at USAMRIID.

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[redacted] who was a [redacted], was the link between IVINS' lab group and the irradiation process for the Dugway spores. [redacted] worked at USAMRIID in the late 1990s for approximately [redacted] to [redacted] years and was described as a [redacted]
[redacted]

[redacted] had *B.a.* spores irradiated at USAMRIID in the fall of 2001 [redacted]

[redacted] The spores would have been in a tube contained inside of a centrifuge bottle. IVINS would have records documenting this irradiation.

[redacted] during an aerosol challenge, [redacted] would enter and spend time in the following rooms: Room [redacted] where [redacted] would plate out the *B.a.* recovered from the all glass impingers (AGIs); Room [redacted] where the supplies, incubators, and aerosol challenge log-in book were located; Room [redacted] where the majority of the aerosol challenges were conducted

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and either one or two hood lines would be in use during a spray; Room [redacted] where an additional hood line was sometimes utilized; Rooms [redacted] and [redacted] where the animals were kept; Rooms [redacted] and [redacted] where individuals from the Bacteriology Division had laboratory space; Room [redacted] which was Bacteriology lab space as well as where [redacted] would borrow plate spreaders from; Rooms [redacted] and [redacted] which were [redacted] laboratories; Rooms [redacted] and [redacted] which thinks were Bacteriology labs which [redacted] may have entered to look for someone; the [redacted] floor break room across from the Room [redacted] cold room; and the [redacted] floor passbox.

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[redacted] would enter Building [redacted] through the loading dock if [redacted] needed to gain access to the animal rooms, as that was the most direct route to that area. At one point, [redacted] kept some guinea pigs back in the animal rooms of the [redacted] floor including Rooms [redacted] and [redacted] agreed to do a walk through the cold side of Building [redacted] with the agents at a future date.

[redacted] and [redacted] worked in Rooms [redacted] and [redacted] of Building [redacted] did some guinea pig studies in the [redacted] in the [redacted] suite of rooms and had an assembly line to bleed guinea pigs set up in the [redacted] hallway. [redacted] would anesthetize the guinea pigs, remove them from their cages, and place them in plastic dish pans brought over from Suite [redacted] would leave the guinea pigs in the pans until they were anesthetized enough to bleed. As these dish pans were considered general lab equipment, [redacted] would have taken one from the Room [redacted] and Room [redacted] areas if [redacted] needed an extra. After use, [redacted] would have cleaned the pan and placed it back where [redacted] obtained it from. [redacted] also would have taken paper towels from Rooms [redacted] and [redacted]

[redacted]
[redacted]

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Continuation of FD-302 of [redacted]

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[redacted]

[redacted]

SSA [redacted] exited the interview at this point, 10:50am.

[redacted] obtained a Fischer Scientific catalog to show the aforementioned plastic dish pans to SA [redacted]. The smaller size pan's dimensions were $14 \frac{1}{8}$ " X $12 \frac{1}{8}$ " x $5 \frac{5}{8}$ " and the larger pan's dimensions were $21 \frac{3}{8}$ " X $17 \frac{1}{8}$ " x $5 \frac{1}{8}$ ". [redacted] advised that the pans were most likely ordered from Fischer Scientific.

Sometimes during aerosol challenges, [redacted] would talk to [redacted] in [redacted] lab which may have been Room [redacted] in Building [redacted]. [redacted] had [redacted] examine some plates containing B.a. Ames spores in the hood to see the colony morphology differences that [redacted] had noticed in the material contained in the fall 2001 anthrax mailings. [redacted] would have worn gloves to handle plates inside of the hood.

During the renovation of some cold rooms in [redacted] had to move some of IVINS' lab group's equipment and supplies from the [redacted] floor to the [redacted]
[redacted]

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[redacted] may have disposed of some masks and syringe plungers in the trash in Building [redacted]

[redacted] has walked through the hallway past Rooms [redacted] and [redacted] in Building [redacted] to get to the Veterinary Medicine Pharmacy, however [redacted] never entered either room. [redacted]

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[redacted] At the end of that hallway is a treatment room for animals where training was conducted.

[redacted] does not recall using the refrigerator in Room [redacted], however [redacted] has been in the office adjacent to that room. Room [redacted] houses some scintillation counters that [redacted] used to run samples through during the late 1990s. [redacted] also thought that there was a sharps drop off point near [redacted] and [redacted]. If [redacted] needed to obtain something from the irradiation room, [redacted] would have gone to [redacted] and asked for it.

[redacted] who works as an [redacted]
[redacted] does radiation swipes around USAMRIID. [redacted]

[redacted] also worked as an irradiation technician while [redacted] was employed at USAMRIID, and [redacted] described [redacted] as a friendly [redacted] did not spend a lot of time around the irradiation area talking to any of the technicians.

[redacted] has never been to the penthouse of Building [redacted] and [redacted] has never stored anything there. IVINS' lab group did not store anything in the [redacted] penthouse, however the [redacted] Division employees working in [redacted] most likely did.

[redacted] reviewed some of [redacted] personal notebooks and determined that the [redacted] studies that [redacted] conducted in Building [redacted] were done in approximately [redacted] or [redacted]. IVINS wrote the protocols for the study and therefore may have a more precise record of the time frame.

[redacted] worked on a [redacted]
from [redacted] to [redacted] with [redacted] IVINS, [redacted]
The project was conducted with [redacted]
the assistance of [redacted] of the [redacted] Division at [redacted]
USAMRIID, and [redacted] is a [redacted]

The [redacted] protocol was dated 1997, and the [redacted]
were immunized in the fall of 1997 and challenged in December 1997.

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The [redacted] were vaccinated using this gene gun which shot gold beads through the surface of the skin using helium. These gold beads were coated with the deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) of the agent being studied, and the animals were thereby vaccinated. [redacted] thought these [redacted] vaccinations may have been done in [redacted]. The protocol indicated that the animals were to be housed in Room [redacted] in Building [redacted] but [redacted] advised that they may not have actually been kept there.

[redacted] never entered the hot side of Building [redacted] until after the renovations in the late 1990s were complete. [redacted] recalled having a tour of the hot side while it was still down for the renovations. [redacted] recalled Room [redacted] in [redacted] because it had been painted [redacted] when it was [redacted] lab space.

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b7CDate of transcription 10/20/2003

On October 17, 2003, [REDACTED] date of birth [REDACTED], social security/account number [REDACTED] was interviewed at [REDACTED] place of employment [REDACTED] located at [REDACTED] telephone [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] After being advised of the identity of the agents and the purpose of the interview [REDACTED] provided the following information:

[REDACTED] recalled some additional information regarding the use of Building [REDACTED] after [REDACTED] interview with SSA [REDACTED] and SA [REDACTED] recalled that [REDACTED] a visiting scientist from [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] during 1999 or 2000, used laboratory space in Room [REDACTED] of Building [REDACTED] and had unescorted access to the facility. [REDACTED] worked with *Brucella* sp. and often disposed of media plates containing *Brucella* in the garbage without wrapping them in parafilm. [REDACTED] also recalled that [REDACTED] often used laboratory supplies without replacing them.

[REDACTED] never entered the Government Services Administration (GSA) warehouse located in Springfield, Virginia where contaminated mail from the Brentwood Postal facility was stored after the fall 2001 anthrax mailings.

[REDACTED] was able to provide a hard copy of only one electronic mail message (email) that [REDACTED] sent during either of the mailing windows, [REDACTED] and [REDACTED]. The hard copy of the email that [REDACTED] provided to the agents was a message sent to [REDACTED] on [REDACTED] at [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] saved this email as it contained information about a project that [REDACTED] were collaborating on. This document is maintained in an FD-340 1A envelope. During the time that [REDACTED] was employed at USAMRIID, [REDACTED] did not routinely save [REDACTED] work to the L drive and rarely archived [REDACTED] emails.

Investigation on 10/17/2003 at [REDACTED] Maryland b7E

File # 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID 279A-BA-C101392 Date dictated N/A
by SSA [REDACTED] [REDACTED] Y/N

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Continuation of FD-302 of [redacted]

, On 10/17/2003

, Page 2

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[redacted] Because [redacted] was [redacted]
[redacted] USAMRIID during or after [redacted] did not
think that [redacted] knew [redacted]

Because of [redacted] job as a [redacted]
[redacted] entered and worked in most areas of USAMRIID.

[redacted] During that time, [redacted] worked in
the [redacted] which was located near the
irradiation rooms in Building [redacted]

[redacted] had no knowledge of [redacted] access
to different areas of USAMRIID during [redacted]

[redacted] advised that [redacted] would have primarily
worked in [redacted] areas, including Building [redacted] did not know
if [redacted]

[redacted] Although [redacted] did not think that [redacted] would have
worked in [redacted], Room [redacted] because it was laboratory space [redacted] may
have worked in [redacted] Room [redacted] as it contained [redacted]
[redacted] did not know if [redacted] ever entered Suite [redacted] or Room [redacted] in
[redacted]

[redacted] was advised that [redacted] is on a list of
USAMRIID employees who had access to B.a., and will therefore need
to be contacted and interviewed again by the FBI.

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Continuation of FD-302 of [redacted]

, On 10/17/2003 , Page 3

Neither [redacted] nor [redacted] were working at USAMRIID when [redacted] began employment there. [redacted] never met [redacted] and met [redacted] when [redacted]
[redacted]

[redacted] knew [redacted] fairly well, as [redacted] was a member of [redacted] was not aware of any grudges that [redacted] may have had against the government. [redacted] advised that typical of someone who had worked for [redacted] years, [redacted] was anxious to [redacted] IVINS [redacted] knew [redacted] well. In the general discussions at USAMRIID after the fall 2001 anthrax mailings, there was not any speculation that [redacted] could have been the mailer.

[redacted] worked with B.a. [redacted]
[redacted] Although Suite [redacted] was [redacted] laboratory space,
[redacted] Specifically, Rooms [redacted] and [redacted] were assigned to [redacted] After [redacted] also worked in Room [redacted] frequently.

[redacted]
[redacted] did not know when [redacted] last had access to B.a., but advised that IVINS would know that information.

[redacted]
[redacted] While at USAMRIID, [redacted] had [redacted] notebooks in [redacted] possession, but [redacted]
[redacted] advised that the notebooks may also be maintained in the USAMRIID library.

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Continuation of FD-302 of [redacted]

, On 10/17/2003, Page 4

[redacted] had no knowledge of whether MIKESELL knew anything about the weaponization of anthrax. MIKESELL told [redacted] that Battelle Memorial Laboratory had done some powdered B.a. work for the government, however [redacted] thought this may have been done using a surrogate strain of B.a. [redacted] advised that MIKESELL must have told [redacted] about this work at Battelle Memorial Laboratory after the fall 2001 anthrax mailings, as prior to that [redacted] did not know that anyone ever manufactured powdered B.a. spores.

Any B.a. Ames that was submitted to the FBI repository labeled as MIKESELL'S material would have originally been obtained from either [redacted] or [redacted] as [redacted] did not think that MIKESELL grew any B.a. Ames himself. MIKESELL did not like [redacted] [redacted] and therefore would not have obtained any B.a. from [redacted]. [redacted] did not know if MIKESELL ever provided B.a. Ames to anyone either within USAMRIID or at any other outside laboratories. [redacted]

a list of what MIKESELL sent to the FBI repository and noted that a rather convoluted numbering system was used for samples at that time.

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MIKESELL'S entire collection of B.a., including duplicates as well as the samples from [redacted] was maintained in Suite [redacted] in the chest freezer in the suite hallway and in an upright freezer in his laboratory space.

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MIKESELL attended the anthrax conferences in 1995, 1998, and 2001. [redacted] advised that the anthrax conferences were not held according to any routine schedule, such as every one or two years.

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BA-1004 is the B.a. Ames number in the FBI repository. The Texas-2 strain was isolated from a sheep's liver from Texas by [redacted] IVINS. [redacted] and conducted some biochemical characterization. [redacted] did not know if Texas-2 was sent to [redacted] for genotyping. BA-1050 was isolated from a calf in 1980 by [redacted] at [redacted]

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[redacted] This reprint is maintained in an FD-340 1A envelope.

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Continuation of FD-302 of [redacted]

, On 10/17/2003, Page 6

[redacted]

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[redacted] the Porton Down Ames appeared to be more virulent than the USAMRIID Ames in vaccinated guinea pigs. [redacted] cautioned that not all of the animals used in the study had received AVA from the same production lot.

The Porton Down Ames is still at USAMRIID and [redacted] drafted a memorandum reassigning custody of the [redacted] to IVINS. [redacted] advised that [redacted] is most likely working with AO-462 now and that IVINS would have only peripheral involvement with the project. The AO-462 sample at USAMRIID is most likely stored in the cold room in Suite [redacted] or in the refrigerator in Room [redacted]. Any spore preparations created from the Porton Down Ames should be stored in these same locations.

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[redacted] did not have any knowledge that the Porton Down Ames was included in [redacted] B.a. collection, [redacted]

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b7C

[redacted] did not know if the Porton Down Ames was submitted to the FBI repository, and advised that it would be labeled as AO-462 if it had been included.

[redacted] a hard copy of an email sent to IVINS from [redacted] on May 10, 2000 regarding samples from the diversity set that were being shipped to IVINS. This document is maintained in an FD-340 1A envelope. [redacted] advised that Northern Arizona University has sent the diversity set to numerous other places, and that [redacted] would have records of what laboratories have received it.

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 11/25/2003

On November 21, 2003, [REDACTED] date of birth [REDACTED] social security account number [REDACTED] was interviewed at [REDACTED] place of employment [REDACTED] located at [REDACTED] telephone [REDACTED]


[REDACTED] After being advised of the identity of the investigators and the purpose of the interview, [REDACTED] provided the following information:

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[REDACTED]



[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] recalled that the FBI only requested that B.a. Ames be sent to the repository, and that they were specific regarding what samples they needed. At the time the repository was being assembled, there was not a large institutional database at the United States Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID). [REDACTED] advised that even if there had been

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Investigation on 11/21/2003 at [REDACTED] Maryland

b7E

File # 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID/ 279A-BA-C101392 Date dictated N/A
437
 Postal Inspector

by SA [REDACTED]

Y/N

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription

02/10/2004

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b7C

On February 6, 2004, [REDACTED] date of birth [REDACTED], social security account number [REDACTED] was interviewed at [REDACTED] place of employment, [REDACTED] located at [REDACTED] telephone [REDACTED]. After being advised of the identity of the investigators and the purpose of the interview [REDACTED] provided the following information:

[REDACTED]

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MIKESELL left behind his entire culture collection when he departed from USAMRIID. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] notebooks were left with [REDACTED] for use as a reference. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Prior to [REDACTED] created B.a. Ames spore preparations (spore preps) using the Leighton-Doi method. [REDACTED] estimated that [REDACTED] made approximately two liters with a concentration of 10^{10} or 10^{11} approximately [REDACTED]. The two liters were divided into eight flasks, and [REDACTED] finished with a volume of 500 milliliters. This final 500 milliliters was combined

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Investigation on 02/06/2004 at [REDACTED] Maryland

File # 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID 279A-BA-C101392 Date dictated N/A
by SA [REDACTED] Postal Inspectorb6
b7C

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Continuation of FD-302 of [redacted]

, On 02/06/2004, Page 2

[redacted]
[redacted] did not grow Ames as frequently because [redacted] was conducting B.a. strain studies and was therefore growing multiple different strains of B.a.

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[redacted]
[redacted] did not know whether any of [redacted] spore preps still remained at USAMRIID, and advised the agents that IVINS may be able to provide that information. IVINS may still have some spore preps [redacted]

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[redacted]
[redacted] advised that [redacted] may have some of [redacted] samples that [redacted] is not aware of.

[redacted] did not recall receiving any communication from the front office of USAMRIID regarding what was to be submitted to the FBIR, and [redacted] was not contacted directly by anyone regarding FBIR submissions. The communication from the front office may have been in the form of a memorandum that IVINS and [redacted] received, [redacted]

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[redacted]
[redacted] advised that [redacted] would check [redacted] files to see if [redacted] had any communication from the front office regarding FBIR submissions.

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[redacted]
There were discussions at the higher levels of USAMRIID about how to best break down the work, and [redacted] assumed that FBI personnel were a party to these discussions. [redacted] advised that it was a confusing situation in the beginning, because at that time "Ames was just Ames". [redacted]

[redacted]
At that time, efforts were directed more toward determination of whether the original B.a. Ames sample was from Texas or Iowa. There was much more interest in the original Ames sample, and SSA [redacted] was interested in seeing the vial containing the original Ames. There were digital photographs taken of the tube and the disk was given SSA [redacted]

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b7C

Continuation of FD-302 of

, On 02/06/2004, Page 3

[redacted] was advised that the agents would be re-contacting [redacted] advised that works in [redacted] lab at USAMRIID [redacted]
[redacted] and that [redacted] can be reached at [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted] only knows of one [redacted] who works at USAMRIID.
[redacted] who works in [redacted] at USAMRIID,
[redacted]

[redacted] agreed to come into FBI workspace and provide a handwriting sample at a later date. [redacted] was advised that SA [redacted] and Postal Inspector [redacted] would coordinate the details with [redacted]

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 02/26/2004b6
b7c

[redacted] On February 25, 2004, [redacted] born [redacted] was interviewed at [redacted] place of employment, [redacted] by United States Postal Inspector [redacted] and Supervisory Special Agent [redacted] of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). [redacted] already familiar with the identity of the interviewing agents, provided the following information:

In [redacted] bacterial work at the United States Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID), [redacted] used water from a large filtration system located in Suite [redacted] building [redacted] to make media and reagents. The filtration system is either a Millipore™ system or one with a similar name and has at least three filter cartridges. It is probably more than distilled water, but [redacted] "doesn't know all that" about the type of water obtained from the system. The system was in place for the entire time [redacted] worked at USAMRIID, and it is probably still there. It is not in a separate laboratory within Suite [redacted] but is located beside the autoclave inside Suite [redacted]. To [redacted] knowledge, the system has not been replaced. Someone in [redacted] research group was responsible for maintaining this water system, but [redacted] could not recall who the individual was.

[redacted]
[redacted] BRUCE IVINS obtained the water for all media preparation and reagents from the system in [redacted]. One of the reagents [redacted] used the water for was a 10X salt solution.

[redacted] did not use the [redacted] water for the washing and storage of *Bacillus anthracis* Ames spores. [redacted] did not use the water for preparing the 1% phenol solution in which Ames spores were stored.

Investigation on 02/25/04 at [redacted] Maryland

File # 279A-WF-222936USAMRIID, 279A-BA-C101392 Date dictated N/A

Insp. [redacted]
by SSA [redacted]

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b7c

Continuation of FD-302 of [redacted]

, On 02/25/04, Page 2

[redacted]
[redacted] does not know enough about the types of water filtration and preparation to be able to say whether or not [redacted] has ever used double-distilled deionized water in [redacted] Ames work. [redacted] has not used any other sources of water than the two sources described in this interview.

For the vaccine challenges, which are conducted in building [redacted] of USAMRIID, the Ames spore preparations made by [redacted] referred to as challenge material.

The tubes containing the AGI contents, which were handed out through the hood line, two tubes at a time, were taken to Room [redacted]. In Room [redacted] dilutions were made, and two of the dilutions were plated. [redacted] believes that IVINS used the purchased sterile water for injection to create the dilutions, but [redacted] is not certain.

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Continuation of FD-302 of [redacted]

, On 02/25/04, Page 3

[redacted]
[redacted]

Room [redacted] did not have a key card reader. [redacted] believes it had one of the punch-button locks like those on several other doors in the [redacted] containment area.

Immediately after the colony forming units (CFUs) were counted the following day, the plates were taped up, put in an autoclave bag, and put in the [redacted] basement beside the autoclave with the other trash to be autoclaved. The used plates were not left in Room [redacted] even for a few hours but were always taken downstairs immediately after being counted.

The counts of the CFUs were used in determination of the "inhaled dose" for the study. The calculation involved a "horrendous formula" which included the air volume breathed in by the animal, the starting dose of Ames, and the amount of material remaining in the AGI after the test.

The dilution tubes and the AGIs were autoclaved at the end of the hood line by [redacted] IVINS prior to being bagged and taken to the basement autoclave. These materials were actually autoclaved twice.

The Animal Caretakers always took care of autoclaving the bags of trash left beside the basement autoclave. [redacted] did not know how long the trash might be left beside the autoclave until it was taken care of.

[redacted]

When [redacted] conducted a study with numerous strains of *Bacillus anthracis*, [redacted] found that some of the strains did not sporulate well or sporulated but lost refractility easily (the

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Continuation of FD-302 of [redacted]

, On 02/25/04, Page 4

heat-shocking process would then kill the spores). [redacted] grew spores from these strains on agar instead of broth. Ames was never a problem in terms of sporulation or refractivity loss, so [redacted] did not produce Ames spores on agar.

IVINS would have been the person to document any activity in the Ames challenge studies. [redacted]
[redacted]

On the days of aerosol challenges, IVINS would come into USAMRIID very early in the morning, heat shock the Ames preparations and aliquot it into the tubes. If he took the material to [redacted] too early, there is a chance he may have put the tubes in a refrigerator until the technicians were ready to conduct the challenge. Normally, everything was well-timed and the material was used immediately.

[redacted] were the only two technicians involved in the Ames challenges. When they left USAMRIID, some other technicians may have participated. [redacted] had been with [redacted]
[redacted]
[redacted]

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

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b7CDate of transcription 04/13/2004

On April 8, 2004, [REDACTED] date of birth [REDACTED], social security account number [REDACTED] was interviewed at the Amerithrax 3 offsite located at [REDACTED] Frederick, Maryland. After being advised of the identity of the agents and the purpose of the interview, [REDACTED] provided the following information:

[REDACTED] did not know for certain whether the flasks containing *Bacillus anthracis* (B.a.) Ames from Dugway Proving Grounds contained only Dugway Ames and not any other material. [REDACTED] did not recall ever pouring anything into the Dugway flasks.

On the morning of an aerosol challenge, BRUCE IVINS would heat shock the B.a. Ames spores being used in the spray and divide them into 8 milliliter (mL) aliquots. One tube of the B.a. Ames spore prep was used for each animal in an aerosol challenge. [REDACTED]

To conduct an aerosol challenge, the hood line was opened, the Ames spore material was poured into the collision, and the animal was exposed to the B.a. Ames. The material collected in the all glass impinger (AGI) was then "plated out". When the aerosol challenge was finished, they opened the collision and poured the material back into its tube. These tubes stayed in an ice bucket in the hood until the spray was finished. To [REDACTED] knowledge, the material collected from the collision was always destroyed, but it was up to the Aerobiology technicians to autoclave and dispose of it.

The AGI and dilution tubes were kept in the refrigerator until the next day so that the material could be plated out again in case there was a problem with growth on the plates. Once the plates were counted, [REDACTED] IVINS [REDACTED] would autoclave the material at the autoclave located at the end of the hood line.

When the entire process was finished, the material from the AGIs and collisions was bagged up and passed out of the suite. [REDACTED] assumed that the material was autoclaved. Material from the AGI was never saved from any particular aerosol challenges. [REDACTED] could not recall any specific dates on which aerosol challenges took place. [REDACTED]

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b7CInvestigation on 04/08/2004 at Frederick, MarylandFile # 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID✓ 279A-BA-C101392 Date dictated N/ASSA
by SA [REDACTED]

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Continuation of FD-302 of [redacted]

, On 04/08/2004, Page 2

A typical colony count for a post-challenge plate of AGI material was 50 to 100 colonies per plate after 24 hours of growth. They did not plate straight from the AGI, but rather diluted it. Although the target challenge range was 10^6 or 10^8 , there may have been a wide range on either side of the target between what was in the AGI and what was plugged into the plethysmograph. If the aerosolization process was not very efficient, as little as ten colonies per plate might grow. If the aerosolization was extra efficient, more than one hundred colonies per plate might grow.

[redacted] advised that the process tended to be less efficient rather than more, and therefore they plated two dilutions to ensure the proper amount of growth.

[redacted]

[redacted] did not know of any other additives that had been used with any of their aerosol challenges. [redacted] had no knowledge that any anti-foam was used with any other select agents, and assumed that anti-foam was only used with viral agents.

[redacted] would obtain sterile water for injection (SWI) from them for use in the challenge. [redacted] assumed that they either had access to SWI of their own, or that they obtained SWI from IVINS.

[redacted] advised that sample numbers 1029 and 1030 did not mean anything to [redacted]. [redacted] did not know what samples those numbers referred to.

[redacted]

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Continuation of FD-302 of [redacted], On 04/08/2004, Page 3

[redacted] advised that when they were making a new spore preparation, they would streak a plate from their frozen stock. They did not create a new batch of spores using material from a flask. They may also have had a smaller tube of their stock in the cold room that they would have used. They would have always used IVINS' B.a. Ames.

From approximately 1996 to 1997, Building [redacted] was being renovated. The first time that [redacted] was ever on the hot side of [redacted] was for an aerosol challenge in [redacted]

[redacted]
[redacted]
[redacted]
[redacted]

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Continuation of FD-302 of

[redacted]

, On 04/08/2004, Page 4

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted] had no knowledge of an individual named [redacted]

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

b6
b7cDate of transcription 09/23/2004

[redacted] date of birth [redacted] social security account number [redacted] was interviewed at the FBI's Amerithrax III office located at 4640 Wedgewood Boulevard, Frederick, Maryland, 21703. After being advised of the identities of the interviewing agents and the nature of the interview, [redacted] provided the following information:

[redacted] started working at the United States Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Disease (USAMRIID) in [redacted] as a [redacted]

[redacted] did not conduct any aerosol challenges. [redacted] noted that spores used for IM challenges were not density gradient purified as are spores used for aerosol challenges. [redacted] first memory of aerosol challenges conducted were in 1990 or 1991 at the time of the Gulf War. These challenges were conducted using the Vollum 1B strain of *Bacillus anthracis* (Ba). [redacted] did not participate directly in these challenges. [redacted] was not allowed to enter building [redacted] where these challenges took place until after [redacted] was renovated and returned to service. The first large batch of spores that [redacted] recalls making was back in [redacted]. They were required to grow two logs greater than normally required for a study. [redacted] does not recall the specific details of this large batch.

[redacted]
For seed stock, Ivins [redacted] would use vials of Ames stored in a box in a freezer in [redacted]. These vials were Ames strain Ba from the original 1981 slant. [redacted]

Investigation on 09/17/2004 at Frederick, MarylandFile # 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID - 981Date dictated N/Aby SA SA [redacted]

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Continuation of FD-302 of [redacted]

, On 09/17/2004 , Page

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[redacted] taught [redacted] to make spores in [redacted]

[redacted] was shown a photograph of a tube labeled "Ames Stock, [redacted] written in blue ink. [redacted] was not familiar with this tube.

[redacted] was shown a photograph of a tube labeled "Ames Spores, [redacted] written in black ink. [redacted] did not recognize this tube, although [redacted] noted that the part of the tube labeled "Ames Spores" was Ivins' handwriting.

[redacted] was shown a photograph of a tube labeled "Ames Spores, [redacted] written in green ink. [redacted] was not familiar with this tube.

[redacted] was shown a photograph of a tube labeled "Ames Spores, [redacted] written in blue ink. [redacted] recognized the handwriting on this tube as [redacted] handwriting, although [redacted] was unfamiliar with the origin of this sample. [redacted] did not recognize the [redacted] labeling written on the vial and the [redacted] was not in [redacted] handwriting.

[redacted] was shown a copy of a USAMRIID form 11R documenting the shipment of Ba from USAMRIID to Duoway Proving Grounds (DPG) in 1997. After reviewing the form, [redacted] was unable to determine what was sent to DPG. [redacted] noted that they must have sent spores because they were sent refrigerated (versus frozen). Vegetative cells have to be shipped frozen while spores can be shipped refrigerated. [redacted] believes that Ivins would have sent DPG

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Continuation of FD-302 of [redacted]

, On 09/17/2004 , Page 6

the same seed stock they were using (the vials in the cardboard box in [redacted])

[redacted] knows that Perry Mikesell's collection of Ames strain Ba is from [redacted] stock or [redacted] stock because the technician who built Mikesell's collection for him got the Ba from [redacted]. Mikesell also had his technicians isolate material from a lot of paint cans brought to USAMRIID by a former researcher named [redacted]
[redacted]

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b7C

[redacted] was the only other person who [redacted] recalled may have helped with batch production at USAMRIID.
[redacted]

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

b6
b7CDate of transcription 03/16/2006

On March 15, 2006, [redacted] date of birth [redacted] social security number [redacted] was interviewed at [redacted] place of employment, the United States Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID), Fort Detrick, Maryland, work telephone number [redacted]. After being advised of the identity of the interviewing agents and the purpose of the interview, [redacted] provided the following information:

[redacted] was shown a copy of a USAMRIID floorplan highlighting Building [redacted] Room [redacted] and was asked about the fermenter inside, assigned to [redacted] may have used this fermenter for [redacted] rarely visited the containment suites in Building [redacted] and spent over [redacted] percent of [redacted] time in Building [redacted] knew [redacted] and [redacted] [redacted] both used the fermenter for [redacted] work. [redacted] thought *Bacillus subtilis* (*Bs*) may also have been fermented. In addition, individuals from the [redacted] section may have used the fermenter at some point. [redacted] was adamant that neither *Bacillus anthracis* (*Ba*) nor Ames would have been fermented, as this was clearly not allowed and a no-no. The USAMRIID floorplan copy shown to [redacted] is maintained in the 1A section of the file.

The mention of the fermenter made [redacted] remember that [redacted]

The [redacted] fermenter was bolted in place, so it would be extremely difficult to move it out of Suite [redacted]. For this reason, [redacted] did not think the fermenter had ever been loaned out to other researchers or facilities. Shaker flask apparatus were also large and would be difficult to move to another location for any unauthorized work. [redacted] never noted any individual who showed a special interest in the fermenter, and no one discussed using it for producing Ames. [redacted] would be more likely to know about any [redacted]

Investigation on 03/15/2006 at Fort Detrick, Maryland

File # 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID-[redacted] Date dictated N/A
by SA [redacted] SA [redacted]

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Continuation of FD-302 of [redacted]

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specific equipment logs or records used in the fermenter's operation. [redacted] believed [redacted] sometimes entered Suite [redacted] at night during fermenter runs to ensure that everything was running smoothly. Standard operating procedures (SOPs) were likely in place for the fermenter, although [redacted] did not know any specific fermenter SOPs.

[redacted] had never seen [redacted] allow unauthorized individuals into a containment suite. [redacted]

[redacted] liked [redacted] is no longer employed at USAMRIID.

[redacted] never noticed individuals in Suite [redacted] who were likely unauthorized. [redacted] was not acquainted with all of the animal caretakers, but since the work the unknown individuals were performing was in line with the duties of animal caretakers, [redacted] felt these unknown individuals were legitimate.

There were three autoclaves in Suite [redacted] did not often use the autoclaves. One was large and used mainly by animal caretakers and the other two were small and used mainly by the [redacted]. When [redacted] needed to autoclave samples [redacted] started the autoclave immediately unless another [redacted] was going to bring samples to the autoclave straightaway. [redacted]

[redacted] never saw individuals take samples from inside the autoclave, to include Ames.

The small autoclaves were nonfunctional approximately 50 percent of the times [redacted] attempted to use them. When both small autoclaves were nonfunctional, [redacted] put [redacted] material back in the biosafety cabinet. [redacted] never tried to use the large autoclave.

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Continuation of FD-302 of [redacted]

, On 03/15/2006 , Page 3

[redacted] samples destined for the autoclave were usually labeled only with [redacted] name. Most USAMRIID employees are aware that [redacted] works with Ba and [redacted] work, [redacted]
[redacted]

[redacted] believed it was general knowledge around USAMRIID that Ames was kept in Suites [redacted]

[redacted] was unsure whether Ames was housed in Building [redacted] except for when used during aerosol challenges. [redacted] may keep Ames stock in Building [redacted]. Prior to 2001, the walk-in cooler, Room [redacted] of Building [redacted] held [redacted] samples, and liquid flasks. [redacted] never saw Ba or Ames in the walk-in cooler in Room [redacted]

[redacted] believed [redacted] received Δ -Ames from BRUCE IVINS for [redacted] doubted [redacted] received virulent Ames from IVINS or [redacted] although it was possible. IVINS told [redacted] to retrieve the Δ -Ames [redacted] took a frozen stock scraping of the Δ -Ames and returned the vial to the proper location. [redacted] speculated that IVINS [redacted] may be more stringent with their distribution of virulent Ames. Regardless, it would be extremely easy for someone to take a stock scraping of a vial without permission, since Ames storage locations before 2001 were not locked and there were long periods in which no one was around these storage locations.

[redacted] was never denied any sample by [redacted] were accommodating with each other, especially before 2001.

[redacted] never noticed any suspicious dry or powdered work being conducted. Lyophilizers have pumps that make noise so nearby individuals would be aware that the lyophilizer was in use. However, it likely would not dawn on anyone to think that anything sinister was being produced and therefore that someone should probe more closely.

[redacted] was not familiar with the names [redacted]
[redacted]

[redacted] liked IVINS, and felt [redacted] had a good demeanor and was a very good scientist. [redacted] IVINS shared conservative political philosophies [redacted]


[redacted] never discussed politics. [redacted] was a hard worker, and [redacted] was also unsure of [redacted] political views.

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Continuation of FD-302 of [redacted]

, On 03/15/2006, Page 4

[redacted] did not own an EZ Pass.

[redacted] was shown four photographs of different angles of one flask labeled "RMR 1029." [redacted] could not identify this flask and had never seen it before. The four photographs shown to [redacted] are maintained in the 1A section of the file.

[redacted] never for Ames or Ba. [redacted] was not familiar with "renocal."

Ba cells sporulate late in culture, and supernatants do not clump very much. [redacted] had observed the morphology of Ba spores derived from vegetative cells grown on agar, and noted that microscopic examination of these Ba spores revealed various cellular debris. Ba sporulation under such conditions appears to be an all-or-none phenomena.

[redacted] thought the mailer, for safety reasons, could have experimented with weaponization techniques on Δ -ANR, which is similar to virulent Ames. The mailer could then have progressed to Ames when he or she was proficient with weaponizing Δ -ANR.

A large rectangular box with a black border, located at the bottom of the page, likely redacting sensitive information.

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Continuation of FD-302 of [redacted], On 03/15/2006, Page 5

[redacted] escorted [redacted] to Building [redacted]. Room [redacted] accessible because the hot areas to the east were under renovation and blocked off. Therefore, Room [redacted] was currently classified as "cold." There were no samples or reagents of any kind in Room [redacted] the room appeared to be unused. Across the hall was a break room, Room [redacted]. Only water was allowed to be consumed in the break room.

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

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[redacted] date of birth
[redacted] social security account number [redacted] home address [redacted] home telephone number [redacted] was interviewed at the FBI offsite office, 4640 Wedgewood Blvd, Frederick, Maryland 21703 by Postal Inspector [redacted] and FBI Special Agent [redacted] After being advised of the identity of the interviewing agents and the purpose of the interview, [redacted] provided the following information:

[redacted] is not familiar with the label "RMR 1029", referencing the Ames strain *Bacillus anthracis* (Ba) spore samples provided to the FBI by the United States Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID), Fort Detrick, Maryland. However, [redacted] is familiar with said sample referenced as the "Dugway Spores" or "Dugway Material".

Upon [redacted] understanding that the Dugway Material (DM) appears to be genetically similar to the material used in the anthrax mailings [redacted] stated that it was "scary". [redacted] believes that there could be a high probability that someone at USAMRIID, with whom [redacted] has worked in the past, may have played some role in perpetrating the anthrax mailings. In an effort to explain from where the DM may have been acquired, [redacted] stated that perhaps Dugway Proving Grounds did not send all the anthrax spores that were made for USAMRIID's studies to USAMRIID, and that someone might have acquired the spore material from the Dugway facility.

[redacted] does not specifically recall ever mixing batches of spores into any one large batch. [redacted] admits that would be a viable technique to generate a large volume of liquid anthrax spore preparation for animal challenges; however, [redacted] does not recall ever personally doing so or seeing anyone else do so. [redacted] would not have kept notes on any such practice.

[redacted] explained that in the 1990's, members of the Bacteriology Division at USAMRIID would calculate how much spore material they would need for animal challenges. Once USAMRIID realized that a large amount of spores was required and it would take USAMRIID several years to make this amount of spores, they [redacted]

Investigation on 3/31/2005 at Frederick, MarylandFile # 279A-WF-22936-302-4373 Date dictated N/Aby SA [redacted] Postal Inspector

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

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Continuation of FD-302 of [redacted]

, On 3/31/2005 , Page 2

contracted with Dugway Proving Grounds to make a large number of Ba spores for USAMRIID's studies.

[redacted] does not know anyone who would have had the knowledge to create dry, virulent anthrax, including [redacted] at the time of the mailings. [redacted] stated that currently, post attack [redacted] has a better idea of how the drying process might be done. [redacted] believes that perhaps Dr. BRUCE IVINS or [redacted] [redacted] may have made dry, non-virulent material in the past but could not elaborate. [redacted] stated [redacted] was not aware of any dry work being done with non-virulent material at USAMRIID by [redacted] or others.

[redacted] verbally listed the following names of individuals [redacted] had worked with while employed at USAMRIID who had access to labs [redacted] and [redacted] in building [redacted] and who would be considered to have the expertise to competently prepare anthrax spores: [redacted], BRUCE IVINS, [redacted]
[redacted]

[redacted] does not believe that [redacted] had the expertise to prepare dry anthrax spores.

[redacted] stated that access to the [redacted] suites was granted exclusively to USAMRIID employees. Visitors from outside USAMRIID would need an authorized escort to access the suites. [redacted] stated that, at times, maintenance personnel with the proper vaccinations could also access the suites unescorted.

[redacted] does not recall other scientists, not assigned to the [redacted] Division, to ever access suites [redacted]

With reference to individuals at USAMRIID who [redacted] believed to have personal stability issues either at home, in the workplace, or otherwise; [redacted] stated that [redacted] was difficult to get along with and the [redacted] felt [redacted] to be less stable than most. [redacted] could not always be counted on and wasn't reliable in some studies. [redacted] was very strange.

Upon understanding that there has been an unexplained 100ml volume loss of a liquid Ames spore preparation of the Dugway Material, controlled by Dr. BRUCE IVINS, between May 1999 and

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Continuation of FD-302 of [redacted], On 3/31/2005, Page 3

February 2000, [redacted] stated that it was indeed a significant loss and that it seemed "weird". [redacted] stated that BRUCE IVINS is a competent scientist. [redacted] stated that [redacted] IVINS was emotionally "up and down" as [redacted] had left [redacted] IVINS saw [redacted] as one of his few friends and was sad that [redacted] was gone. IVINS was having a "tough" time and he enjoyed the daily interaction he had with [redacted]. [redacted] stated that IVINS would have days where he was very "mopey". [redacted] was aware that IVINS sent many emails to [redacted]

[redacted] stated that IVINS is an "eccentric" individual but that [redacted] would definitely put IVINS on the "solid list". [redacted] stated that many of people in the scientific field are a bit "weird". [redacted] stated that [redacted] was aware that IVINS had some issues at home that would make him up and down at work. [redacted] understood that most of IVINS problems were with [redacted]. [redacted] stated that [redacted] was not aware if IVINS had ever had any professional psychiatric or emotional treatment and was not aware of any medications that might be prescribed to him. [redacted] stated that [redacted] did not know IVINS to abuse alcohol; however, he would occasionally "have too much" at social gatherings. [redacted] stated that the chance of BRUCE IVINS being involved in the anthrax mailings was "absolutely none."

[redacted] expressed [redacted] opinion as to who might be involved in the anthrax mailings. [redacted] stated that [redacted] wouldn't be surprised if [redacted] had some involvement in the attacks. [redacted] stated that [redacted] didn't get along with [redacted] but does not think [redacted] would have been involved in the anthrax mailings.

[redacted] stated that people with a motive to commit such an attack might be Diagnostic Systems Division (DSD) personnel at USAMRIID as their job was to conduct rapid field diagnosis of biological agents. [redacted] stated that the anthrax mailings might be a good scenario for DSD.

Outside of USAMRIID, [redacted] stated that [redacted] believes the company Bioport, Inc., in Michigan, had the most to gain. [redacted] stated that because one of the anthrax letters said to take penicillin [redacted] would be suspicious of a Bioport employee as having written the note. [redacted] feels that because of the level of

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Continuation of FD-302 of [redacted], On 3/31/2005, Page 4

incompetence and lack of understanding of microbiology displayed by Bioport staff, "They wouldn't know that today you take Cipro for an anthrax exposure, not penicillin."

[redacted] stated that while USAMRIID staff was working on Bioport projects [redacted] and others felt it was an "enormous waste of time." [redacted] stated that working with Bioport was often frustrating as USAMRIID would give professional opinions and suggestions about protocols, methods and procedure, but Bioport would discount USAMRIID's suggestions.

[redacted] recalls that during the time of the Bioport project, sometime in 2000, [redacted]

[redacted] There would have been no opportunity for anyone to access any of the stored biological agents during this time without anyone knowing.

[redacted] stated that perhaps anyone with a difference in opinion regarding the United State's preparedness or lack thereof for an anthrax attack might perpetrate such an attack to make a point. [redacted] stated that [redacted] might have such an opinion.

[redacted] stated that [redacted] was not aware of any projects conducted "off the books". [redacted]

[redacted] Sometimes Ames would be prepared and not put on the books if it was for some other investigator's study. As much as 25ml to 35ml of purified liquid Ames spore preparation could be made in one batch. The concentration level of said preparations could be approximately 10^9 /ml.

[redacted] does not recall USAMRIID ever ordering a large decontamination of suite [redacted] in 2001. Decontamination procedures were conducted as needed. Biological agents would be boxed up and transferred back-and-forth from [redacted] to accommodate any decontamination of the storage areas within the suites.

[redacted] stated that the only way one might be able to remove a select agent from the [redacted] suites would be via the pass box and airlock. [redacted] believes that [redacted] may have passed well-secured single plates of Ames material out for [redacted] studies.

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Continuation of FD-302 of [redacted]

, On 3/31/2005, Page 5

[redacted] believes that the reason IVINS took it upon himself to conduct a swabbing, without prior approval, to check for contamination outside the suites was following [redacted] complaints of poor handling procedures by [redacted] and another unknown person went to the Safety Division and complained, but nothing had been done. IVINS wanted to show that [redacted] work area had indeed been contaminated. [redacted] stated that it didn't make sense that a subsequent swabbing conducted by USAMRIID personnel, as ordered by USAMRIID command, resulted negatively for contamination. [redacted] stated that IVINS [redacted] [redacted] was afraid that USAMRIID command might be upset with his actions.

[redacted] stated that when the FBI subpoena for [redacted] was issued, it was not clear who was making the decisions as to what would be collected.

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[redacted] There was no formal instruction given to employees of the [redacted] Division by management regarding what was to be done with regard to the subpoena. Most people weren't clear on exactly what was wanted. No one seemed to be particularly bothered by the subpoena.

[redacted] did not receive an e-mail after September 11, 2001 regarding an order to backup work computer files and take them home for safekeeping.

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[redacted] stated [redacted] could not remember any of the [redacted] being sent out of USAMRIID for anything. [redacted] stated that [redacted] or [redacted] may have used some for experiments with mice.

[redacted] stated that if a bad batch of spore material was unusable, it would either be left in the refrigerator in [redacted] to be autoclaved or would immediately be autoclaved. [redacted]

[redacted] Copies of the aforementioned e-mails are retained in the 1A section of the file.

[redacted] stated that [redacted] was aware of a fermentor in the [redacted] suite. [redacted] understood it was used in the production of Protective Antigen (PA). [redacted] stated there was never any kind

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Continuation of FD-302 of [redacted], On 3/31/2005, Page 6

of official prohibition against using the fermentor to grow virulent spores. There was never a lyophilizer in [redacted]

When discussing a quantity of RMR 1029 that was missing and unaccounted for on the Reference Material Inventory, [redacted] stated that [redacted] cannot understand how 100ml liquid spore preparation would get out of USAMRIID and used in the anthrax mailings. [redacted] stated that one would have to take it to a [redacted] level lab to store it and dry it safely otherwise risking contamination.

[redacted] stated that with regard to IVINS' late night activity at USAMRIID after 9/11/01, IVINS must have been checking on animals. Evening visits to check on animals was common.

[redacted] is not aware of anyone who might have financial connections to Biopart and had no recollection of any other vaccine development company work being conducted at USAMRIID.

[redacted] stated that [redacted] knew the Vaxgen company had paid IVINS royalty money from a development project on which IVINS, [redacted] had worked. The project involved the development of a strain of *Bacillus anthracis* that doesn't sporulate. [redacted]

[redacted] did not know if anyone at USAMRIID received any royalties from vaccine development as a result of the 2001 attacks.

[redacted] did not know of anyone who might have traveled to New Jersey during the 2001 anthrax mailings. IVINS may have traveled there, but [redacted] is not sure.

[redacted] stated that there has always been a bit of a clash between [redacted] and the [redacted] Division. The people in the [redacted] Division were scientifically knowledgeable enough to help [redacted] develop their detection equipment, but [redacted] often sought help and opinion from others outside of USAMRIID. Many in [redacted] felt shunned and somewhat offended. [redacted] and [redacted] personal often had "ego" issues.

[redacted] found it "odd" that IVINS drove to [redacted] and back to Frederick, Maryland in one evening to leave a bottle of wine on [redacted] porch. [redacted] believes IVINS did so purely as a gesture of friendship.

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Continuation of FD-302 of [redacted]

, On 3/31/2005 , Page 7

[redacted] again reiterated that [redacted] believes IVINS had nothing to do with the anthrax attacks. [redacted] did not believe IVINS was under the influence of any medication that would effect his work or judgement. [redacted] stated that IVINS had talked about his mother being "nuts" and struggled with mental challenges. IVINS worried that this problem might be hereditary and that he might one day become mentally unstable. [redacted] stated that [redacted] did not know of IVINS ever having any kind of extramarital affair. IVINS often expressed an extreme dislike for "sorority-type" girls.

[redacted] voluntarily agreed to sign a Non-Disclosure Agreement with reference to any information discussed relevant to this case. SA [redacted] and Postal Inspector [redacted] witnessed said agreement. The aforementioned agreement is retained in the 1A section of this file.

On 4/1/05, [redacted] contacted Postal Inspector [redacted] via telephone at approximately 7:30a.m. [redacted] expressed that [redacted] had been thinking about the interview the day prior and had remembered that a man named [redacted] accessed the suites alone. [redacted] heard talk that someone had seen [redacted] leave the suites without showering out of the suites. Other facilities repair people such as electricians and plumbers with the proper vaccinations would access the suites alone.

[redacted] recalled that [redacted] had visited USAMRIID in 1999 to work with [redacted] on a study for two or three weeks. [redacted] thought it strange that [redacted] would often be at work waiting for [redacted] an hour earlier than [redacted] needed to be.

[redacted] requested that [redacted] be able to review any notebooks that the FBI might have obtained from USAMRIID. [redacted] would like to refresh [redacted] memory as to the projects [redacted] and other [redacted] Division members might have been working on in an attempt to explain the missing volumes of spore preparation from IVINS [redacted] Material. [redacted] stated that the missing spore preparation is very "weird".

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The following investigation was conducted by Postal Inspector [redacted] on December 15, 2006 at, [redacted]
[redacted]

A review of [redacted] personnel file was conducted. [redacted] was employed at [redacted] from [redacted] until [redacted] resignation in [redacted]. The personnel file contained very few documents, mostly related to [redacted] employment and conduct policies. No derogatory information was noted. Contained within the file were three letters of recommendation [redacted]
[redacted]



FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 02/27/2007

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To: Washington Field

From: Washington Field

AMX-2

Contact: SA [redacted]

Approved By: [redacted]

Drafted By: [redacted]

Case ID #: 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID (Pending) -1692

Title: AMERITHRAX;
MAJOR CASE 184

[redacted] 72


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Synopsis: To provide periodic results of investigation.

Details: Special Agent (SA) [redacted] AMERITHRAX Squad 2 (AMX-2) thoroughly examined the key card access records pertaining to former United States Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID) employee, [redacted] pertaining to [redacted] activities within USAMRIID during the period of time from 09/11/2001 until the anthrax-laced letter mailings of 2001.

By way of background, the Ames strain of *Bacillus anthracis*, the bacterium responsible for the deaths and illnesses associated with the anthrax-laced letter mailings of 2001, are maintained in Biosafety Level (BSL) 3 biocontainment suites within USAMRIID building [redacted] and [redacted]. Prior to the anthrax-laced letter mailings of 2001, USAMRIID building 1412 and 1425 were equipped with two electronically controlled devices which aside from controlling one's movements in USAMRIID also recorded a USAMRIID employee's movement throughout each building. Each USAMRIID employee was assigned a unique badge and personal identification number (PIN). In order for a USAMRIID employee to enter USAMRIID and access a location known to contain the Ames strain of *Bacillus anthracis* one would, at a minimum, have to use his/her badge a three badge readers just to enter the change room of a containment suite, and then use his/her unique PIN at keypad that allowed egress from the change room and access to the actual hot suite. Conversely, if one exited from a hot suite and USAMRIID his/her movements would be identified as key card activity at the badge reader that allowed exit from the change room and typically two more badge readers to exit the building..

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To: Washington Field From: Washington Field
Re: 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID, 02/27/2007

Investigation has determined a process, termed "piggybacking," whereby two or more USAMRIID employees simultaneously pass through an electronically controlled access point; however, only one person legitimately uses his/her unique badge/PIN and the other(s) do not. Thus, piggybacking allows for USAMRIID employee(s) to gain covert entry/exit from locations within USAMRIID, to include those locations known to contain the Ames strain of *Bacillus anthracis*.

09/11/2001 through First Window of Opportunity:

A thorough examination of USAMRIID key card access records indicated [REDACTED] accessed the [REDACTED] hot suite, a biocontainment suite within USAMRIID building [REDACTED] known to contain the Ames strain of *Bacillus anthracis*, during normal business hours, on two weekdays from [REDACTED] on 09/11/2001 until [REDACTED] on 09/17/2001. It should be noted [REDACTED] was alone in the [REDACTED] hot suite on one occasion for [REDACTED] whereas the other occasion [REDACTED] was not alone in the hot suite and was in the hot suite for [REDACTED]

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Specifically, [REDACTED] USAMRIID keycard activity indicated the following:

[REDACTED] piggybacked into USAMRIID building [REDACTED] on 09/12/2001, as [REDACTED] next badge reading was at [REDACTED] hours [hours : minutes : seconds (hrs)] at a corridor which leads from the [REDACTED] Division administrative area to the [REDACTED] Division hot suites [REDACTED] next badge reading occurred at [REDACTED] hrs and indicated entry into the [REDACTED] change room for the [REDACTED] hot suite [REDACTED] then entered the [REDACTED] hot suite at [REDACTED] (KEYPAD). [REDACTED] was alone in the [REDACTED] hot suite for approximately [REDACTED] until key card access records indicated [REDACTED] exited the [REDACTED] change room circa [REDACTED] hrs. It is not known what time [REDACTED] left USAMRIID, as key card access records are indicative of piggybacking as [REDACTED] last recorded badge reading was entering the corridor to the [REDACTED] Division at [REDACTED]. It should be noted that both badge readers for USAMRIID building [REDACTED] identified further as [REDACTED] as well as [REDACTED] were functional throughout the day, and in fact, the badge reader at rear door to building [REDACTED], which is [REDACTED] typical entry point showed keycard activity throughout all 24 hours of 09/12/2001. Records also showed that the badge reader at [REDACTED] typical egress point from USAMRIID building [REDACTED] was also functional throughout the 24 hours of 09/12/2001. Although [REDACTED] movements throughout the day are

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To: Washington Field From: Washington Field
Re: 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID, 02/27/2007

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recorded by interior badge readers and/or keypads, it is apparent [REDACTED] piggybacked into and out of USAMRIID [REDACTED] on 09/12/2001. However, key card access records can not elucidate a nefarious intent on [REDACTED] part. Writer opines this warrants further investigation.

[REDACTED] USAMRIID keycard access records indicated on 09/13/2001 [REDACTED] did not enter, or attempt to enter, locations at USAMRIID known to contain the Ames strain of *Bacillus anthracis*. [REDACTED] entered USAMRIID building [REDACTED] at the [REDACTED] door [REDACTED] at [REDACTED] however, it is not known as to what time [REDACTED] left USAMRIID as there is no identifiable badge readings that indicated [REDACTED] left the building on 09/13/2001, [REDACTED] last badge reading was at [REDACTED] hrs leaving the [REDACTED] division hot suite corridor [REDACTED] at [REDACTED] hrs. This piggybacking too may be an item of investigative interest for AMX investigators.

[REDACTED] USAMRIID keycard access records indicated on 09/14/2001 [REDACTED] did not enter, or attempt to enter, locations at USAMRIID known to contain the Ames strain of *Bacillus anthracis*. [REDACTED] arrived at work and entered, [REDACTED] into USAMRIID building [REDACTED] at [REDACTED] hrs and left, [REDACTED] at [REDACTED] hrs.

USAMRIID keycard access records indicated [REDACTED] had no identifiable keycard activity over the following weekend, 09/15-16/2001.

USAMRIID keycard access records indicated [REDACTED] had access to the [REDACTED] containment suite, which was a location known to contain the Ames strain of *Bacillus anthracis* on 09/17/2001. Records indicated [REDACTED] entered USAMRIID building [REDACTED] per [REDACTED] routine, at [REDACTED] hrs. At [REDACTED] entered the [REDACTED] hot suite change room [REDACTED] At [REDACTED] hrs records indicate [REDACTED] accessed the [REDACTED] hot suite [REDACTED] (KEYPAD). [REDACTED] was already in the [REDACTED] hot suite and remained in the [REDACTED] hot suite the entire [REDACTED] was in the [REDACTED] hot suite. [REDACTED] exited the [REDACTED] change room at [REDACTED] and left USAMRIID building [REDACTED] later in the day at [REDACTED] hrs.

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USAMRIID keycard access records indicated [REDACTED] did not access, or attempt to access, locations at USAMRIID known to contain the Ames strain of *Bacillus anthracis* on 09/18/2001. Records indicated [REDACTED] entered USAMRIID [REDACTED] at [REDACTED] hrs, and exited [REDACTED] REAR DR OUT) at [REDACTED] hrs.

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First Window of Opportunity to Second Window of Opportunity:

Between the two windows of opportunity [REDACTED] spent a significant amount of time in the [REDACTED] hot suite as compared to [REDACTED] hot suite activity as described *supra*. During this period [REDACTED] spent approximately [REDACTED] hrs in the [REDACTED] hot suite with [REDACTED] USAMRIID colleagues, and [REDACTED] hrs of alone time in the [REDACTED] hot suite. Specifically, [REDACTED] activity during this period is described further as:

USAMRIID key card access records indicated [REDACTED] had access to the Ames strain of *Bacillus anthracis* on 09/19/2001. [REDACTED] entered USAMRIID building [REDACTED] per [REDACTED] at [REDACTED] hrs and accessed the [REDACTED] change room [REDACTED] later in the morning at [REDACTED] hrs. [REDACTED] accessed the [REDACTED] hot suite [REDACTED] KEYPAD) at [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] was already in the [REDACTED] hot suite, and [REDACTED] as well as [REDACTED] all entered the [REDACTED] hot suite soon after [REDACTED] piggybacked out of the [REDACTED] change room. [REDACTED] next identifiable key card entry is at [REDACTED] hrs at the badge reader located at the [REDACTED] of USAMRIID [REDACTED]. It should be noted [REDACTED] exited the [REDACTED] change room [REDACTED] at [REDACTED] hrs, and it is plausible that [REDACTED] exited with [REDACTED] at this time, as it would take a minute or less to walk from the [REDACTED] change room to the [REDACTED] also piggybacked out of the USAMRIID as [REDACTED] last keycard activity was at [REDACTED] hrs leaving the corridor from the [REDACTED] division in USAMRIID [REDACTED]. Writer opines, this warrants further investigation.

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USAMRIID key card access records indicated [REDACTED] had access to the Ames strain of *Bacillus anthracis* twice on 09/20/2001. [REDACTED] was not alone in the [REDACTED] hot suite on these two occasions. [REDACTED] arrival and departure times were [REDACTED] on 09/20/2001. [REDACTED] accessed [REDACTED] hot suite [REDACTED] KEYPAD) at [REDACTED] hrs and was in the hot suite for approximately [REDACTED] minutes and [REDACTED] seconds. [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] were already in the [REDACTED] hot suite prior to [REDACTED] entry. Although records indicated [REDACTED] left the [REDACTED] hot suite prior to [REDACTED] remained in the [REDACTED] hot suite for the duration of hot suite time. [REDACTED] again entered the [REDACTED] hot

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suite later in the afternoon at [] hrs [] KEYPAD). [] was already in the [] hot suite prior to [] entry and remained after [] left the [] hot suite at [] hrs [] was in the [] hot suite with [] USAMRIID co-workers for approximately [] minutes and [] seconds on 09/20/2001.

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USAMRIID key card access records indicated []

[] on Friday, 09/21/2001; however, records also indicated [] did not access, or attempt to access, locations at USAMRIID known to contain the Ames strain of *Bacillus anthracis*. [] entered USAMRIID building [] at [] hrs [] and exited the same at [] hrs. This too may be an item of investigative interest to AMX investigators.

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USAMRIID key card access records indicated [] had no identifiable activity over the following weekend, 9/22-23/2001.

USAMRIID key card access records indicated [] accessed locations at USAMRIID known to contain the Ames strain of *Bacillus anthracis* twice on 09/24/2001. [] arrival and departure times at USAMRIID on 09/24/2001 were []. [] entered the [] hot suite at 08:12:40 hrs []. [] was alone in the [] hot suite for approximately [] minutes and [] seconds until [] entered at [] hrs [] KEYPAD). Later, [] and [] also entered the [] hot suite while [] and [] were in there. [] exited the [] hot suite circa [] hrs []. [] re-entered the [] hot suite later in the afternoon on 09/24/2001. It should be noted that before [] entered the [] hot suite on the afternoon of 09/24/2001, [] was already in the [] hot suite when [] accessed the []. It is not known if [] was passing items into the [] hot suite or removing items, this may be an item of investigative interest. Nevertheless, [] exited the [] hot suite prior to [] entry at [] hrs [] KEYPAD). [] was alone in the [] hot suite for approximately [] minutes and [] seconds until [] exited the [] change room at [] hrs []. On 09/24/2001 [] was alone in the [] hot suite for approximately [] minutes and [] seconds, as well as was in the [] hot suite with [] USAMRIID co-workers for [] hrs.

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USAMRIID key card access records indicated [] accessed locations at USAMRIID known to contain the Ames strain of *Bacillus anthracis* on 09/25/2001. [] arrival and departure times at USAMRIID on 09/25/2001 were [].

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[redacted] entry into the [redacted] hot suite was [redacted] as [redacted] entered [redacted] PIN twice, once at [redacted] hrs [redacted] access granted) and again at [redacted] hrs [redacted] access granted). Prior to entering the [redacted] hot suite, [redacted] access the [redacted] change room at [redacted] hrs [redacted]. The only other activity at the [redacted] change room card reader occurred at [redacted] hrs, when a special needs soiled linen collector, [redacted] who was employed by the [redacted] (Frederick, Maryland), accessed the [redacted] change room. While the circumstances surrounding [redacted] keypad activity are not known, USAMRIID key card access records indicated [redacted] was never alone in the [redacted] hot suite following [redacted] activity at the [redacted] keypad, as [redacted] or [redacted] remained in the [redacted] hot suite with [redacted]. It should be noted, that [redacted] exited the [redacted] change room at [redacted] hrs, a thorough examination of [redacted] keycard activity around that time indicated [redacted] exited the change room alone. It is not known when [redacted] exited USAMRIID building [redacted] as USAMRIID keycard access records indicated [redacted] piggybacked out of the building. [redacted] last keycard activity on 09/25/2001 was noted to be [redacted] entry into the [redacted] Division corridor near the [redacted] containment suites at [redacted] hrs [redacted]. Although [redacted] was not alone in the [redacted] hot suite on 09/25/2001, [redacted] spent approximately [redacted] hrs in the [redacted] hot suite, this in addition to [redacted] activities at the KEYPAD and [redacted] piggybacking out of USAMRIID warrant further investigative efforts.

USAMRIID key card access records indicated [redacted] accessed locations at USAMRIID known to contain the Ames strain of *Bacillus anthracis* twice on 09/26/2001. [redacted] arrival and departure times at USAMRIID on 09/26/2001 were unremarkable. [redacted] entered the [redacted] hot suite at [redacted] hrs [redacted] KEYPAD). [redacted] was already in the [redacted] hot suite before [redacted] entered. Soon after [redacted] entered, the following USAMRIID employees also entered the [redacted] hot suite [redacted] BRUCE IVINS, and [redacted]. While [redacted] IVINS, and [redacted] exited the [redacted] hot suite before [redacted] and [redacted] remained in the [redacted] hot suite with [redacted] exited the [redacted] change room circa [redacted] hrs [redacted] and does not return to the [redacted] hot suite until later in the afternoon. Before [redacted] returned to the [redacted] hot suite on the afternoon of 09/26/2001, IVINS was already in the [redacted] hot suite; however, [redacted] exited almost immediately upon [redacted] arrival at [redacted] hrs [redacted] KEYPAD) and [redacted] was alone in the [redacted] hot suite until [redacted] entered at [redacted] hrs. After [redacted] entered, and [redacted] also entered the [redacted] hot suite before [redacted] exited at circa [redacted] hrs [redacted] was alone in the [redacted] hot suite for approximately [redacted] minutes and [redacted] seconds, and

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was in the the [] hot suite with [] USAMRIID colleagues for approximately [] minutes and [] seconds on 09/26/2001.

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USAMRIID key card access records indicated [] accessed locations at USAMRIID known to contain the Ames strain of *Bacillus anthracis* on 09/27/2001. [] arrival and departure times at USAMRIID on 09/27/2001 were []. [] entered the [] hot suite at [] hrs [] KEYPAD). [] and [] were already in the [] hot suite, and after [] entered, [] and [] also entered the [] hot suite. [] and [] remained in the [] hot suite when [] exited circa []. On 09/27/2001, [] was in the [] hot suite with [] USAMRIID colleagues for approximately [] hrs.

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USAMRIID key card access records indicated [] accessed locations at USAMRIID known to contain the Ames strain of *Bacillus anthracis* on 09/28/2001. [] arrival and departure times at USAMRIID on 09/28/2001 were []. [] entered the [] hot suite at [] hrs [] KEYPAD). [] were already in the [] hot suite prior to entry, and both remained in the [] hot suite after [] left circa [] hrs [] was in the [] hot suite with [] USAMRIID colleagues for approximately [] minutes and [] seconds.

USAMRIID key card access records indicated [] was alone in the [] hot suite twice during the weekend on 09/29-30/2001; however, the time of day was consistent with [] hot suite activity on 09/27/2001 and 09/28/2001, and was indicative []. On 09/29/2001 [] entered USAMRIID building [] at [] hrs []. [] entered the [] hot suite at [] hrs [] KEYPAD) and was alone in the [] hot suite until [] exited circa [] hrs [] left USAMRIID building [] at [] hrs []. On Sunday, 09/30/2001, [] entered USAMRIID building [] at [] hrs []. [] entered the [] hot suite at [] hrs [] and was alone until [] exit circa [] hrs []. [] exited USAMRIID building [] at [] hrs []. [] was alone in the [] hot suite on the weekend of 09/29-30/2001 for approximately [] minutes on 09/29/2001, and for approximately [] minutes and [] seconds on 09/30/2001.

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USAMRIID key card access records indicated [] had access to locations at USAMRIID known to contain the Ames strain of *Bacillus anthracis* on the following Monday, 10/01/2001. [] arrival and entry times into USAMRIID building [] were unremarkable. [] entered the [] hot suite at []

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hrs [redacted] and was alone in the [redacted] hot suite for approximately [redacted] minutes and [redacted] seconds until [redacted] entered the [redacted] hot suite. Following [redacted] entry into the [redacted] hot suite the following USAMRIID employees also entered the [redacted] hot suite with [redacted] and [redacted]

[redacted] exited the [redacted] hot suite circa [redacted] hrs [redacted] departure from USAMRIID building [redacted] is unknown and is indicative of piggybacking, as [redacted] last keycard activity on 10/01/2001 occurred at [redacted] hrs leaving the [redacted] Division corridor adjacent to the [redacted] hot suite [redacted]. Although [redacted] was with [redacted] USAMRIID colleagues in the [redacted] hot suite on 10/01/2001 for approximately [redacted] hrs [redacted] was also alone in the [redacted] hot suite for approximately [redacted] minutes and [redacted] seconds, this in conjunction with [redacted] piggybacking from USAMRIID on the afternoon/evening of the same warrants further investigation.

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USAMRIID key card access records for the following Tuesday and Wednesday, 10/02/2001 and 10/03/2001 respectively, indicated no activity for [redacted]. As [redacted] did not work full days on the weekend of 09/29-30/2001, it is unclear to writer if these are scheduled days off, vacation days, or sick leave. The fact the they follow a day in which [redacted] had substantial [redacted] hot suite access warrants further investigation.

USAMRIID key card access records indicated [redacted] had access to locations known to contain the Ames strain of *Bacillus anthracis* twice on Thursday, 10/04/2001. [redacted] arrival and departure times for 10/04/2001 were unremarkable. [redacted] entered the [redacted] hot suite at [redacted] hrs [redacted] KEYPAD) and was alone for approximately [redacted] minutes and [redacted] seconds until [redacted] [redacted] entered the [redacted] hot suite. After [redacted] entered, [redacted] also entered the [redacted] hot suite both [redacted] and [redacted] remained in the [redacted] hot suite after [redacted] left circa [redacted] hrs [redacted] [redacted] did not re-enter the [redacted] hot suite until later in the afternoon. Later in the afternoon on 10/04/2001 [redacted] re-entered the [redacted] hot suite at [redacted] hrs [redacted] KEYPAD). IVINS and [redacted] were already in the [redacted] hot suite. After [redacted] entered, then [redacted] also entered. Although IVINS left before [redacted] both [redacted] and [redacted] remained in the [redacted] suite after [redacted] exited circa [redacted] hrs [redacted]. On 10/04/2001, [redacted] was alone in the [redacted] hot suite for approximately [redacted] minutes and [redacted] seconds, as well as was in the [redacted] hot suite with [redacted] USAMRIID colleagues for approximately [redacted] hrs.

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USAMRIID key card access records indicated [redacted] had access to locations at USAMRIID known to contain the Ames strain of *Bacillus anthracis* on Friday, 10/05/2001. [redacted] arrival time at USAMRIID building [redacted] is unremarkable. [redacted] entered

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the [redacted] hot suite at [redacted] hrs [redacted] KEYPAD) and was alone for approximately [redacted] minutes and [redacted] seconds until [redacted] entered the [redacted] hot suite. After [redacted] entered, [redacted] and [redacted] also entered the [redacted] hot suite. [redacted] and [redacted] remained in the [redacted] hot suite after [redacted] exited circa [redacted] hrs [redacted] departure from USAMRIID building [redacted] is unknown and is indicative piggybacking. [redacted] last known key card activity was leaving the corridor adjacent to the [redacted] hot suite [redacted] at [redacted] hrs. Again [redacted] piggybacking, this time on the eve of the second window of opportunity, in conjunction with [redacted] alone time in the [redacted] hot suite, warrants further investigation.

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USAMRIID key card access records indicated no activity for [redacted] on Saturday, 10/06/2001, Sunday, 10/07/2001, nor the following Columbus Day Holiday, Monday, 10/08/2001. USAMRIID key card access records indicated [redacted] returned to USAMRIID building [redacted] at [redacted] hrs [redacted] on 10/09/2001.

SUMMARY:

[redacted] Between 09/11/2001 and the first window of opportunity [redacted] had access to Ames strain of *Bacillus anthracis* twice. Both occasions were during normal business hours, and tally approximately [redacted] minutes and [redacted] seconds of [redacted] hot suite time. It should be noted of this [redacted] minutes and [redacted] seconds, [redacted] was alone in the [redacted] hot suite for approximately [redacted] minutes and [redacted] seconds on 09/12/2001, whereas for the remainder [redacted] hot suite time other [redacted] Division co-workers were in the [redacted] hot suite with [redacted]. Although [redacted] hot suite time was minimal during this period, concern is raised due to [redacted] piggybacking into/out of USAMRIID building [redacted]. For example, on 09/12/2001 [redacted] is alone in the [redacted] hot suite, and [redacted] departure time from USAMRIID is unknown as [redacted] piggybacked out. This and the other examples for this period describe *supra* warrant further investigation.

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Between the two windows of opportunity [redacted] time in the [redacted] hot suite increased dramatically, to include weekend work in which [redacted] was alone in the [redacted] hot suite. Piggybacking from the [redacted] change room on 09/19/2001 prevents writer from ascertaining an accurate account of [redacted] total [redacted] hot suite time; however, if one excludes [redacted] hot suite activity on 09/19/2001 from the total, [redacted] spent [redacted] hrs in the [redacted] hot suite with [redacted] co-workers, and had [redacted] hrs of [redacted] hot suite access in which [redacted] was alone. Again, piggybacking during this period presents difficulty in ascertaining [redacted] true

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work hours at USAMRIID as well as within the [redacted] hot suite, and warrants further investigation.

[redacted] It is interesting to note, that during these periods [redacted] and IVINS were in the [redacted] hot suite together for minimal periods of time on two occasions. Whereas, the following USAMRIID employees were in the [redacted] hot suite with [redacted] for significant periods of time: [redacted]

[redacted] Other USAMRIID employees, such as:

[redacted] and [redacted]
[redacted] had less frequent shared [redacted] hot suite time with [redacted]

Investigative efforts continue and future periodic investigative reports will be addressed under separate communications.

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

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b7CDate of transcription 04/13/2007

On [redacted] date of birth [redacted]
[redacted] social security account number [redacted] cell phone
number [redacted] was telephonically interviewed. After being
advised of the identity of the interviewing agent [redacted] provided
the following information:

[redacted] advised that several hours earlier on this day,
[redacted] had spoken via telephone to BRUCE IVINS.


[redacted]
[redacted] advised that IVINS caught [redacted] a little off guard and did not think
that IVINS should be asking [redacted] these types of questions. [redacted]
thought that it was apparent that IVINS was asking these types of
questions because someone was asking IVINS the same questions.

[redacted] indicated that since [redacted] recent interview with
investigators [redacted] simply did not know how to respond to IVINS [redacted]
[redacted] advised that when speaking to IVINS on
the phone [redacted] advised him that, off the top of [redacted] head, [redacted] could
not recall [redacted]

Investigation on 04/10/2007 at Frederick, Maryland (telephonically)

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by PI [redacted]



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b7CDate of transcription 04/13/2007

On April 10, 2007, [redacted] date of birth [redacted], social security account number [redacted] after being advised of the identity of the interviewing agents [redacted] provided the following information:

[redacted] advised that [redacted] was agreeable to [redacted]
[redacted]

maintained in the 1A subfile.

During this brief meeting with [redacted] agents also issued a federal Grand Jury subpoena to [redacted] indicating a specific time and date [redacted] is required to provide information to members of the Amerithrax Task Force. [redacted] opined that [redacted] current thought process pertaining to IVINS has changed a little from what it used to be in the past [redacted] is more skeptical concerning his past behaviors than [redacted] used to be. [redacted] explained that IVINS has always been a little strange and has always done peculiar things. IVINS has always been a practical jokester.

[redacted]

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b7CInvestigation on 04/10/2007 at Frederick, MarylandFile # 279A-WF-222936-DEI - 69Date dictated 04/13/2007by PI
SA [redacted]b6
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This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

[redacted]



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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

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Date of transcription 04/04/2007

On April 3, 2007, [redacted], date of birth [redacted] (1217910, [redacted]), social security account number [redacted], was interviewed at an FBI office in Frederick, Maryland. After being advised of the identity of the interviewing agents and the purpose of the interview, [redacted] signed a Non-Disclosure Agreement form which was placed in a FD-340 and maintained in the 1A subfile. [redacted] provided the following information:

[redacted] resides at [redacted] home telephone number: [redacted], and personal cellular phone number: [redacted]. [redacted] is employed as a [redacted]

[redacted] briefly described [redacted] job as [redacted]

Prior to the start of any questioning, [redacted] abruptly interjected that [redacted] wanted to report a recent conversation [redacted] had with a colleague named [redacted]. [redacted] explained that [redacted] had met [redacted] and that [redacted] queried [redacted] on numerous occasions for information concerning [redacted] BRUCE IVINS' involvement in the anthrax investigation. [redacted] advised that [redacted] made [redacted] feel very uncomfortable by asking these questions and that [redacted] felt the line of questioning was very inappropriate and simply wanted to report this interaction to investigators. [redacted] reiterated that [redacted]

[redacted] implied to [redacted] that [redacted] was making the inquiries because [redacted] had recently been questioned by investigators about [redacted] association with [redacted] IVINS as part of a routine background security clearance investigation.

[redacted] was asked to describe what [redacted] understood about the anthrax investigation to date. [redacted] responded by advising that [redacted] is of the belief that investigators believe that the evidentiary anthrax powder in the mailed letters originated from the [redacted] Division of the U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID). [redacted] also added that it was

Investigation on 04/03/2007 at Frederick, Maryland

File # 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID-171 Date dictated N/A
by SA [redacted]
PI [redacted]

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Continuation of FD-302 of [redacted]

, On 04/03/2007, Page 2b6
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believed [by the AMERITHRAX Task Force] that BRUCE IVINS may have had involvement in the mailings based on an inventory sheet maintained by IVINS showing the miscalculation of spores. [redacted] recalled that there was a volume discrepancy on the form from one input line to the next. Also, [redacted] had been asked about IVINS' behavior before.

[redacted] was asked to think back to the time period when the FBI Repository (FBIR) [redacted] was established. [redacted] believed this to be the time period of late 2001 to early 2002. [redacted] was shown a copy of the subpoena attachment page which described [redacted]. [redacted] acknowledged having viewed this document at or around the time of [redacted]. [redacted] also recalled that the subpoena requested [redacted]
[redacted]
[redacted]
[redacted]
[redacted]
[redacted]

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Continuation of FD-302 of [redacted], On 04/03/2007, Page 3

- [redacted]
- [redacted]
- [redacted]
- [redacted]
- [redacted]

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[redacted]

[redacted]

- [redacted]
- [redacted]
- [redacted]
- [redacted]
- [redacted]

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[redacted] does not recall having received instructions on how to prepare the slants. [redacted] was shown a copy of the subpoena page [redacted] which has been placed in a FD-340 and maintained in the IA subfile. [redacted] did not recall ever seeing that page. When asked if the subpoena instructions would have been common sense in comparison to [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

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Continuation of FD-302 of [redacted], On 04/03/2007, Page 4

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[redacted] does not believe that [redacted] would have colony picked to prepare a slant. [redacted] that would go against [redacted] teaching. [redacted] described [redacted] teaching as a combination of [redacted] and conversations that [redacted] had with others.

[redacted] was shown a photograph labeled [redacted] depicting [redacted] submitted to [redacted] on 02/27/2002, which have been placed in a FD-340 and maintained in the 1A subfile [redacted] recognized [redacted] containing the handwriting of [redacted] and IVINS. More specifically, in the order from top to bottom: the label bearing the information [redacted]

[redacted] and the label bearing the information [redacted] Bruce Ivins 2/27/02," was IVINS' handwriting.

[redacted] was shown a photograph labeled [redacted] depicting [redacted] submitted to the FBIR on April 10, 2002, which has been placed in a FD-340 and maintained in the 1A subfile. [redacted] recognized the handwriting on the labels to be from IVINS. [redacted] also identified these labels as although having different text on the labeling, to mean the same as the previous four labels

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Continuation of FD-302 of [redacted], On 04/03/2007, Page 5

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[redacted]

[redacted] was shown a statement from IVINS identifying [redacted] as submitting the following items to the FBIR in April, 2002:

- 1) [redacted]
- 2) [redacted]
- 3) [redacted]
- 4) [redacted]

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[redacted] did not recognize the numbers as meaning anything to [redacted] absent of a description.

[redacted] was shown access/exit records for [redacted] IVINS for room [redacted] for February 27, 2002; the date of the first FBIR submission [redacted] recognized that [redacted]

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[redacted] [The access records shown to [redacted] were placed in a FD-340 and maintained in the 1A subfile.]

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Continuation of FD-302 of [redacted], On 04/03/2007, Page 6

[redacted] was shown two photographs labeled [redacted]
[redacted] did not recall seeing labels typed-out [redacted]
USAMRIID. When [redacted] labeled a sample as "Ames, the date, and the maker's initials;" then placed it in a rack in cold room or the refrigerator in the laboratory. [The photographs shown to [redacted] were placed in a FD-340 and maintained in the 1A subfile.]

[redacted] stated that there was no universal naming system because at that time, Ames was Ames, so no one would have thought to give it a designation. [redacted]

[redacted]
[redacted]
[redacted] did not take this spreadsheet with [redacted]

[redacted] was shown a photograph of a flask with the writing "7737 RMR 1029." [The photograph shown to [redacted] was placed in a FD-340 and maintained in the 1A subfile.] [redacted] was familiar with this flask and only remembered one flask about this size (1-Liter). [redacted] was familiar with this flask as "Dugway Spores," because those were the spores they used for aerosol challenges. [redacted] recounted that at one time the amount of spores was calculated that would be needed for their work, and it was determined it would be a large amount. Subsequently, it was decided that they would need help with the production of the spores. Dugway was the laboratory contracted to produce the large batch of spores.

The original shipment of the Dugway spores was in the form of a paste. This was re-suspended and eventually purified. [redacted] believed that over time, other batches of USAMRIID spores were added to the Dugway spores.

[redacted] made spores [redacted] at USAMRIID,
[redacted]

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Continuation of FD-302 of [redacted]

, On 04/03/2007 , Page 7

[redacted] IVINS was responsible for maintaining and documenting the inventory.

If spores were needed, [redacted] IVINS was responsible for preparing the spores for aerosol challenges. On the days of the animal challenges, IVINS would go into the lab early in the morning and prepare the spore challenge material and then take the preparation over to Building [redacted]. He also was the person who would give spores to other researchers.

[redacted]
[redacted] recalled seeing a fermenter in [redacted] located close to the end of the room by the autoclave. [redacted] never saw it in use, but remembered it was there when [redacted] began working there in [redacted]. [redacted] believed it was a small fermenter, about five Liters in size. [redacted] thought it was used to grow Stern strain in order to collect the protective antigen and harvest lethal factor (LF). [redacted] had never used a fermenter and had no knowledge of IVINS using it or talking about it. [redacted] believed the fermenter to be the expertise of [redacted] all of the

[redacted] Division at USAMRIID.

[redacted] did not recall anyone wanting to make a large batch production of spores, outside of their current method of production.

Occasionally [redacted] worked weekends [redacted]

[redacted] described this process as the following:

- [redacted]
- [redacted]
- [redacted]
- [redacted]
- [redacted]
- [redacted]

279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID

Continuation of FD-302 of [redacted], On 04/03/2007, Page 8

[redacted]
[redacted] was shown a copy of the worksheet from the [redacted]
[redacted] [The worksheet was placed in a FD-340 and
maintained in the 1A subfile.] [redacted]

[redacted] identified
the handwriting as that of [redacted] IVINS, and believed the rest
belonged to the animal caretakers. The animal caretakers could not
perform all of the checks themselves. Generally, caretakers checked
on the animals in the morning, [redacted]
[redacted] IVINS checked the animals in the evening. The
nighttime checks were performed by IVINS because he lived close.
[redacted] advised that some of the caretakers would not write any
information of the worksheet if there were no dead animals. It was
more important to the experiment for the time of death to be noted
not if there were no deaths. However [redacted] IVINS generally
would write down the negative information. If a squiggly line was
drawn in a column it indicated that no animals survived.

[redacted] was shown a copy of the worksheet from [redacted]
[redacted] [The worksheet was placed in a FD-340 and maintained in
the 1A subfile]. The experiment occurred from [redacted]
through [redacted] described it as similar to the [redacted]
[redacted] recognized a lot of the handwriting as
belonging to IVINS, still performing the nighttime checks.

[redacted] was shown a copy of the worksheet from [redacted]
[redacted] [The worksheet was placed in a FD-340 and
maintained in the 1A subfile]. [redacted]

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Continuation of FD-302 of [redacted], On 04/03/2007, Page 9

[redacted] did not identify IVINS' handwriting.

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[redacted] was shown photographs of three vials known to genetically match the evidence. [The photographs were placed in a FD-340 and maintained in the 1A subfile]. [redacted] advised that the small vial with the writing: [redacted]

[redacted] and the last vial with the writing [redacted] was IVINS' handwriting.

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COVANCE (DENVER, PENNSYLVANIA)

Animal space was in short supply at USAMRIID, so USAMRIID would supply vaccine to Covance, and in turn Covance vaccinated and bled the animals, then shipped them back to USAMRIID. Typically, IVINS, [redacted] would make the 2 1/2 hour trip to Covance.

[redacted] Covance did not have any Bio Safety Level-3 (BSL) laboratories.

Battelle (Columbus, Ohio)

[redacted]
[redacted] Battelle's spores were non-refractile, [redacted] advised that Battelle was doing anthrax vaccine potency testing as part of a contract [redacted]

BIOPORT (LANCING, MICHIGAN)

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279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID

Continuation of FD-302 of [redacted]

, On 04/03/2007 , Page 10

[redacted] Bioport didn't make spores, they just participated in colony count enumeration. Also, they did not use the Ames strain for potency issues.

According to [redacted] Bioport would take diluted material and put it on the plate, then pour molten agar on the top and incubate it. Consequently, they had problems with colony counts. [redacted]

[redacted] believed their problem was they were still using the growth process that came about in the 1970's when the vaccine came about. [redacted] believed this was because they didn't have a lot of "fresh blood" in the laboratory, therefore USAMRIID was showing them basic microbiology.

In addition to [redacted] USAMRIID personnel that went to Bioport were IVINS, [redacted]
[redacted]

BRUCE IVINS

In regards to the AMERITHRAX Investigation, about a year ago, IVINS shared with [redacted] that the word "suspect" has been used about him, although he didn't say why. IVINS also informed [redacted] that he was getting a lawyer and would no longer talk without his lawyer.

[redacted] was shown IVINS' B3 hot suite records for the month of September, broken down into daytime hours versus nighttime hours. [The records were placed in a FD-340 and maintained in the 1A subfile]. [redacted] was surprised at the amount of night time IVINS spent in the suite. [redacted] couldn't think of a reason why he was in the hot suites late at night. According to [redacted] the work wouldn't take that long, it should only take about 20 minutes not hours.

[redacted] believed IVINS spent extra time in the hot suites for a couple of reasons. One reason is that IVINS would use the internet in the suite. About a year ago, IVINS told [redacted] that he liked blindfolded women sites and long-haired women sites. IVINS loved women with long hair. Another reason IVINS spent time in the lab was because he was unhappy at home. [redacted]
[redacted]

279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID

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Continuation of FD-302 of [redacted], On 04/03/2007, Page 11

[redacted] Also, IVINS was frugal, and when he was at USAMRIID he could get free hot water.

[redacted] believed IVINS' behavior changed around the time that [redacted] left USAMRIID [redacted]. Before this time, IVINS didn't really drink. [redacted] he took up drinking. He experimented with alcohol and seemed to like the "buzz", so he would drink a lot really fast. [redacted]

[redacted] IVINS also had doctor-prescribed anti-depressants. [redacted] recalled that once IVINS handed [redacted] a print-out describing a psychiatric disorder. IVINS believed this was his disorder. [redacted] is also aware of IVINS visiting a mental health doctor, both now and previously, to include him getting counseling around the time of his post-doctorate [circa 1976] due to stress. IVINS had also mentioned [redacted] that his mother was "nuts."

[redacted] IVINS acted manic depressive, having significant mood swings. [redacted] is aware of issues with depression and his subsequent medication that he has been given for it. [redacted] IVINS had trouble sleeping. He has used prescription sleep medication [redacted] and [redacted]

[redacted] he had recently experienced some kind of sleep walking incident. He explained that one night, while asleep at home, he had awoken in the middle of the night, and noticed that he was fully dressed and had his car keys in his hands. [redacted] expressed a sense of disbelief that management at USAMRIID continued to allow IVINS to work at USAMRIID considering the new and more stringent safety and security procedures implemented by the Bio Surety program.

[redacted] Also, it was difficult to separate his wacky and eccentric behavior from his other issues. [redacted] also believed that he has grown more eccentric in the last year. Now [redacted] would describe him as someone who could have a mental illness, possibly suffering from manic depression, whereas before [redacted] probably wouldn't have.

[redacted] advised that IVINS was unhappy at work because he was being treated like a technician. He just makes spores and doesn't do real science. According to [redacted] people don't trust IVINS

279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID

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Continuation of FD-302 of [redacted]

, On 04/03/2007, Page 12

anymore so he gets "crap" work. [redacted] suggested to IVINS that he should consider retiring but he would not listen and indicated instead that he could not retire because he needs to continue paying for his kid's health insurance. He also implied that he would not know what to do with himself if he were to retire.

[redacted] felt that IVINS had become increasingly energy draining and high maintenance [redacted]
[redacted]

[redacted] IVINS talks a lot about work [redacted]
[redacted]

IVINS shared stories [redacted] about his personal life.
[redacted] recalled IVINS telling [redacted] that he would drive places but tell his wife he was in the lab and set back the odometer in his car. IVINS told [redacted] about his dislike for sorority girls. As [redacted] recalled, a sorority girl wouldn't go out with him in college so he ended up stealing a secret initiation book. [redacted] thought that this seemed like a big deal to him. [redacted] didn't recall him ever telling [redacted] anything about him getting into trouble.

[redacted]
[redacted] also thought that IVINS' delivery of a package [in the middle of the night] to [redacted] house was weird.

[redacted]
believed that [redacted] was being spied on by the FBI. [redacted] has joked that the FBI has searched [redacted] vehicle in the past and has conducted surveillance on [redacted] residence in [redacted]. To poke fun at IVINS, [redacted] mailed a letter to IVINS, postmarked in New Jersey and addressed the same way that the letters [anthrax letters] were.

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279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID

Continuation of FD-302 of [redacted], On 04/03/2007, Page 13

[redacted]
[redacted] IVINS told [redacted] that an FBI lady was living next to him so she could spy on him. [redacted]

[redacted]
[redacted] believed that IVINS' clandestine swabbing event was a conflict between Bacteriology Division and [redacted] of [redacted] [redacted]; with IVINS trying to catch [redacted] for improper handling of evidence. In addition to this, [redacted] felt that [redacted] didn't like [redacted] Division, so [redacted] wouldn't get any help from [redacted]

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

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b7CDate of transcription 04/12/2007

On April 5, 2007, [redacted] date of birth [redacted]
[redacted] social security account number [redacted] cell phone
number [redacted] voluntarily telephoned Postal Inspector [redacted]
[redacted] and provided the following information:

[redacted] indicated that since [redacted] interview with
investigators on April 3, 2007, [redacted] remembered a few peculiar
things pertaining to BRUCE IVINS and [redacted] wanted to relay those
thoughts while [redacted] still had them fresh in [redacted] memory.

[redacted] recalled that IVINS several years earlier had
told [redacted] that he had maintained a Post Office box at a nearby Post
Office. [redacted] was not positive where the Post Office box was located
but thought it was at the 7th Street Post Office in Frederick,
Maryland. [redacted] was given the impression that IVINS maintained
the Post Office box for the purpose of responding back and forth to
various individuals who had responded to adds IVINS had placed.

[redacted] could not recall what specific form or brand of newspaper
or magazines IVINS placed adds in but recalled that IVINS
advertised that he possessed a Kappa Kappa Gamma (KKG) sorority
handbook which contained various secret and cherished information
solely reserved for KKG members [redacted] believed that IVINS was
advertising that he had access to privileged KKG information and
would be willing to share the secrets with those responding to the
advertisements.

[redacted] advised that [redacted] also remembered IVINS having
mentioned years ago that he had broken into a KKG sorority house to
steal a secret KKG handbook. [redacted] believes that IVINS committed this
crime while working on his Post Doctorate studies at the University
of North Carolina in Chapel Hill.

[redacted] advised that after [redacted]

[redacted] IVINS
established a new and separate e-mail account under the name "Big
Skv". IVINS used this e-mail account to send anonymous e-mails to
[redacted] advised that the e-mails contained language which
.indicated [redacted] was being watched and followed [redacted]
[redacted]

Investigation on 04/05/2007 at Frederick, MD (telephonically)

File # 279A-WF-222936-PE1 -70 Date dictated 4/12/2007

by PI [redacted]

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279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID - 1770

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On April 24, 2007, [REDACTED] date of birth
[REDACTED] social security account number [REDACTED] provided
the following information:

In reference to the unauthorized environmental sampling
performed by BRUCE IVINS, in 2001, [REDACTED] thought it was odd
that [REDACTED] desk was swabbed because [REDACTED] didn't work
at that desk very/much anymore.



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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 04/12/2007

On April 11, 2007 [REDACTED] informed Investigators of a conversation [REDACTED] with BRUCE E. IVINS of the U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID). The conversation took place at [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] provided the following information:

IVINS told [REDACTED] that [REDACTED] and he was nervous about [REDACTED] He had heard stories [REDACTED] IVINS researched [REDACTED] and informed [REDACTED] that he was going to meet with his attorney that day.


He stated that [REDACTED] he felt depressed, but not suicidal; he just didn't feel like doing the things that he always did. IVINS knew the investigators had collected emails and he knew they had "seen everything," and was afraid they would ask about personal information [REDACTED]

IVINS was aware that the investigators even knew the medications that he had taken. Also, IVINS informed [REDACTED] that he was getting copies of his times into and out of the USAMRIID suites because the investigators were asking about those times. To this, IVINS offered that he was in the suites to get away from the world. And since IVINS was no longer in possession of his notebooks [REDACTED]

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Investigation on 04/11/2007 at Frederick, Maryland

File # 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID -1713 Date dictated N/A b6
by SA [REDACTED] b7C
PI [REDACTED]



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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 06/08/2007

On June 8, 2007, [redacted] contacted SA [redacted] to notify [redacted] of a phone call [redacted] had with BRUCE IVINS. [redacted] provided the following information:

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IVINS had tried to contact [redacted] four to five times earlier in the morning. When [redacted] returned IVINS' calls, [redacted] said that he was rambling. He was talking about not being able to remember details associated with his submissions to the FBI Repository (FBIR) [redacted]. IVINS mentioned that he went to [redacted] to get his suite access records for that time frame, however [redacted] informed him that they no longer had those records for that time frame. IVINS complained that he can neither remember nor obtain access to the information that he needed. IVINS also felt as if his "I don't know" answer to FBI questions, was not enough.

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[redacted] described IVINS as sounding depressed [redacted] then very manic [redacted] talked to him on the phone. [redacted] the conversation was all about him not being able to remember the dates of his submissions to the FBIR. [redacted] further described him as a basket case. In comparison to his behaviors, [redacted] he was very upset, this time on the phone was more of a panic hysteria behavior.

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Investigation on 06/06/2007 at Washington, D.C. (telephonically)

File # 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID -1736 Date dictated N/A

by SA [redacted]

[redacted]
A/SSA [redacted]

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

b6
b7CDate of transcription 04/24/2007

[REDACTED] On April 19, 2007, [REDACTED] date of birth [REDACTED], social security account number [REDACTED] was interviewed at an FBI office in Frederick, Maryland. After being advised of the identity of the interviewing agents, and the purpose of the interview, [REDACTED] provided the following information:

In reference to the Bacillus anthracis (Ba) Ames spore batch, "Reference Material Receipt-1029" (RMR-1029), [REDACTED] believed the spores came from Dugway [Dugway Proving Grounds], however, [REDACTED] is unsure of the time frame.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Investigation on 4/19/2007 at Frederick, MarylandFile # 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID - 1740 Date dictated N/A b6
by SA [REDACTED] b7C



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279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID

Continuation of FD-302 of [redacted] , On 4/19/2007 , Page 2

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted] was shown the RMR-1029 inventory sheet that was maintained by IVINS [redacted] did not recall seeing the sheet before. [redacted] believed the RMR-1029 was used for the aerosol challenges, and [redacted] did not help prepare for those challenges.

[redacted] was also under the impression that the spores [redacted] continuously making and purifying were eventually being combined into a larger flask. [redacted]

Agents pointed out to [redacted] that according to the inventory sheet for RMR-1029, no more spores were added to the RMR-1029 flask after 1997. [redacted] didn't know what happened to the smaller flasks of spores that [redacted] had prepared after 1997.

[redacted]

[redacted] was shown [redacted] notebook that illustrated dilutions prepared from RMR-1029. [redacted] noted that the illustrations appeared to be drawn by IVINS. The project was the [redacted] study, and it appeared as if IVINS prepared the dilutions then all of the team did the rest of the study. [redacted] thought it was weird for IVINS to start the study by himself, and then everyone else would do the challenge.

[redacted]

For the purposes of storage, [redacted] remembered non-purified spores being kept in 50-mL falcon tubes, and hypaque purified spores went into a orange screw-top flask.

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Continuation of FD-302 of [redacted]

, On 4/19/2007, Page 3

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[redacted] also advised that [redacted] did not have fermentation experience.

[redacted]

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[redacted]

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According to [redacted] IVINS wrote a lot of letters to the editor. [redacted] remembered [redacted] IVINS writing a response to the group PFLAG [redacted] believed it was Parents of Lesbians and Gays). [redacted] believed that these letters were not anonymous letters.

[redacted] was shown photographs of the envelopes and letters used in the 2001 anthrax-laced mailings, however, they did not look familiar to [redacted] added that IVINS kept envelopes in his office, however they were the business size.

[redacted] believed that IVINS had a good relationship with his children and his brother [redacted]

[redacted] recognized the name [redacted] as an author of a book that was about the meida's impression that the Army added squaline to the anthrax vaccine. IVINS took this accusation personally.

[redacted]

279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID

Continuation of FD-302 of [redacted], On 4/19/2007, Page 4

[redacted]
IVINS told [redacted] that he had a computer program that tracked keystrokes and that was how he found out that [redacted] was reading his emails.

[redacted] believed that IVINS had a memory problem that [redacted] thought was associated to his paranoia. He seemed to forget certain things, however, he could recall something that was involving him a long time ago. [redacted] offered the example that he can remember occasions years past, when he thought people might be talking about him.

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription

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n/a

On August 29, 2007, [REDACTED] date of birth [REDACTED] social security account number [REDACTED] was interviewed at [REDACTED] place of employment, [REDACTED]. Due to [REDACTED] prior interviews, [REDACTED] was already familiar with the interviewing Postal Inspector and after being advised of the nature of the interview [REDACTED] provided the following information:

[REDACTED] was asked to review a document which contained a list of various individuals who reside in the Frederick, Maryland [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] After carefully reviewing the list of names on the document [REDACTED] indicated that [REDACTED] only recognized the name of [REDACTED] advised that [REDACTED] could not provide any more specific information concerning [REDACTED] other than [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] associated with this communication [REDACTED] 12

[REDACTED] was queried about BRUCE IVINS [REDACTED]

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In talking about BRUCE IVINS, [REDACTED] advised that IVINS has been quiet lately, a little more so than usual [REDACTED] believes that IVINS is concerned about an upcoming appointment with his cardiologist [REDACTED] advised that many years ago, long before September 11, 2001, [REDACTED] thought that IVINS taught Cardio Pulmonary Resuscitation (CPR) classes on behalf of the American Red Cross.

Investigation on 08/27/2007 at Frederick, Maryland

File # 279A-WF-222936-BET - H Date dictated N/A

by PI [REDACTED]

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This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

279A-WF-222936-BEI

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Continuation of FD-302 of [redacted], On 08/27/2007, Page 2

[redacted] advised that many years ago, [redacted] IVINS on occasion would talk about [redacted] who/he often referred to as "The ZIP Code Man". IVINS indicated to [redacted] that this uncle was actually the husband of his Aunt [redacted]. [redacted] believed that Aunt [redacted] lived in the McClean, Virginia area and that she was wealthy. [redacted] advised that Aunt [redacted] and the Uncle are both deceased but [redacted] recalled IVINS occasionally talking about the Uncle (name unknown) as the person who invented the ZIP Code. [redacted] advised that IVINS appeared to be very knowledgeable about ZIP codes and all the various different ZIP code regions of the country.

279A-WF-222936-[redacted]-5

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[redacted] In April 2007, [redacted] date of birth
[redacted] social security account number [redacted] agreed
to provide email communications between [redacted] and BRUCE
EDWARDS IVINS.

Emails from the date ranges of [redacted]
through [redacted] were enclosed in a FD-340, 1A-7629,
and submitted to the file.

(X)

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279A-WF-222936-[redacted] 6

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[redacted] In April 2007, [redacted] date of birth
[redacted] social security account number [redacted] agreed
to provide email communications between [redacted] and BRUCE
EDWARDS IVINS.

Emails from the month of [redacted] were enclosed
in a FD-340, 1A-7630, and submitted to the file.

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

b6
b7CDate of transcription 01/08/2008

On the morning of January 04, 2008, [redacted]
Social Security Account Number (SSAN) [redacted] met, as pre-
arranged, with writer. [redacted] provided writer [redacted] emails
which represented recent electronic correspondence between [redacted]
and United States Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious
Diseases (USAMRIID) employee BRUCE IVINS.

Enclosed in the FD-340 associated with this communication are
the abovementioned emails.

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b7CInvestigation on 01/04/2008 at Frederick, MarylandFile # 279A-WF-222936 [redacted] - 7 Date dictated _____by SA [redacted]

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

b6
b7CDate of transcription 02/06/2008

On February 06, 2006, [REDACTED] date of birth [REDACTED] social security account number [REDACTED] contacted SA [REDACTED] telephonically to provide the following information;

[REDACTED]


[REDACTED] has received some emails from IVINS, but mostly from his work account. In the emails, he referred to being contacted by the [REDACTED] And, according to [REDACTED] IVINS had the same old things to say about [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
IVINS informed [REDACTED] that he and his lawyer met with [REDACTED] [REDACTED] and answered all his questions no matter how awkward.


[REDACTED]

Investigation on 02/06/2008 at Washington D.C. (telephonically)
File # 279A-WF-222936 [REDACTED] 8 Date dictated N/A
by SA [REDACTED]

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REDACTED



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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

b6
b7CDate of transcription 02/18/2008

[redacted] On January 24, 2007, [redacted] date of birth [redacted] social security account number [redacted] met with a Task Force Investigator and provided the following information:


[redacted] provided two notebooks. [redacted] indicated that one of the notebooks primarily contained an assortment of documents/SOP's pertaining specifically to [redacted]. The second notebook was labeled, and contained an assortment of documents/SOP's pertaining to [redacted].

[redacted] indicated that most, if not all, of the SOP's and associated documents [redacted] had received over the years were from BRUCE IVINS, and that [redacted] simply maintained all of these documents in these notebooks as reference materials. [redacted] indicated that many of the documents received from IVINS contain identifiers on them indicating which specific lab notebook the SOP's are maintained in.

[redacted] also provided a thick paperback book; *Godel, Escher, Bach: an Eternal Golden Braid*. The book was a gift [redacted] from IVINS, back in the 2006-2007 time-frame. IVINS wanted [redacted] to read the book and on occasion would inquire as [redacted] status on reading it. [redacted] only briefly read a few pages and had no desire to read the book in its entirety. Because of this IVINS seemed a little disenchanted with [redacted] for not reading the book and offering [redacted] insight; and at some point he asked [redacted] for the book back. [redacted] could not understand the book and never finished it, nor did [redacted] give the book back to him.

[redacted] was questioned concerning former U. S. Army Military Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID) [redacted] scientists [redacted] could not ascertain if [redacted] were given Ames Ba, RMR-1029, Dugway spores, when they were conducting their research at USAMRIID, in 1998. [redacted] recalled that [redacted] were conducting research pertaining to [redacted], and whatever material or agent they were working with, they would have got it from IVINS. Additionally, [redacted] would have only gained access into the hot suites via IVINS. They would have entered through the [redacted] rooms and both of

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|------------------|---------------------------|---------------|---------------|-----|
| Investigation on | 01/24/2008 | at | Frederick, MD |) |
| File # | 279A-WF-222936-[redacted] | -86 | Date dictated | N/A |
| by | SA [redacted] | PI [redacted] | b6 | b7C |



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279A-WF-222936-[redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of [redacted], On 01/24/2008, Page 2

them would have been monitored and/or escorted at all times in the hot suite by [redacted] IVINS, [redacted]

[redacted] was unable to recall any specifics pertaining to the possible shift in research work from anthrax vaccine work to other research, back in the time frame of 2001, just prior or around the anthrax-laced letter mailings.

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

b6
b7CDate of transcription 02/18/2008

[redacted] On February 15, 2008 [redacted] date of birth
[redacted] social security account number [redacted] met with
Investigators and provided the following information:

[redacted] provided Investigators with a book titled:
AMERITHRAX The Hunt for the Anthrax Killer. [redacted] was given
the book by BRUCE IVINS, but didn't read it. [redacted]

[redacted]
[redacted] On a separate occasion, he gave
[redacted] the book Vaccine A.
The other book IVINS gave [redacted] recently
provided to Investigators, [Godel, Escher, Bach: an Eternal
Golden Braid] [redacted]

[redacted]
[redacted]
[redacted]
[redacted]
[redacted]

Investigation on 02/15/2008 at Frederick, MDb6
b7CFile # 279A-WF-222936 [redacted] -87
by SA [redacted]
PI [redacted]Date dictated N/A

map

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279A-WF-222936 [redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of [redacted], On 02/15/2008, Page 2

[redacted]
[redacted] was shown a photocopy of SOP number UIB-BI-3, 05/30/1995. [redacted] believed "UIB" stood for Bacteriology Division, "BI" stood for BRUCE IVINS, and "3" maybe stood for the third SOP he had written.

[redacted]
[redacted] was shown a photocopy of a note that is comprised of a mixture of handwriting and magazine cut-outs and started out with the text: [redacted]

[redacted]
[redacted] did not recall IVINS giving [redacted] notes with magazine cut-outs in them, nor does [redacted] remember him leaving [redacted] notes like this.

The documents that were shown to [redacted] were all placed in a FD-340 and sent to the file.

279A-WF-222936-HSAMR/TID

88

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On April 3, 2008 Postal Inspector [REDACTED] briefly met with [REDACTED] and obtained [REDACTED] E-MAIL communications between [REDACTED] and BRUCE WILINS. The E-MAIL communications are dated from [REDACTED] to [REDACTED]. The E-MAILS were collected and sent to the 1A-7714 file.

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

b6
b7CDate of transcription 03/17/2008

On 12/21/2007, [REDACTED] date of birth [REDACTED]
social security account number [REDACTED] electronically provided
a [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

The paper was placed in 1A-7734, and sent to the case file.

Investigation on 12/21/2007 at Washington D.C.File # 279A-WF-222936 [REDACTED] 89Date dictated N/Ab6
b7Cby SA [REDACTED]

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wpd


279A-WF-222936 [redacted]-90
MA:

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In April 2007, [redacted] date of birth [redacted], social security account number [redacted] agreed to provide email communications between [redacted] and BRUCE EDWARDS IVINS.

Emails from the date ranges of [redacted] through [redacted] were enclosed in a FD-340, 1A-7701, and submitted to the file.



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
279A-WF-222936-[redacted]-91

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[redacted]
1

In April 2007, [redacted] date of birth
[redacted] social security account number [redacted] agreed to
provide email communications between [redacted] and BRUCE EDWARDS
IVINS. [redacted]

Emails from the date ranges of [redacted] through
[redacted] were enclosed in a FD-340, 1A-7774, and submitted to
the file.



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SSA

- 1 -

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

b6
b7CDate of transcription 11/21/2007

On November 16, 2007, Special Agent (SA) [REDACTED] of the FBI, Washington Field Office, and Postal Inspector (PI) [REDACTED] met with [REDACTED] in Frederick, Maryland. [REDACTED] provided the following information:

[REDACTED] was shown an email written by BRUCE IVINS, [REDACTED] from the United States Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID). [The email was dated November 19, 2005, and was sent from IVINS's AOL account, KingBadger7@aol.com, to IVINS's work email account. The email was believed to have been printed out on June 7, 2007, based on the date at the bottom of the document. It was discovered from a previous search of IVINS' USAMRIID office.] The email's subject line is "New Thoughts and Theories on the Anthrax Letter Attacks." The email lays out 12 points IVINS believed to be why [REDACTED] and/or [REDACTED] may have been involved in the anthrax letter attacks.

[REDACTED] IVINS called [REDACTED]. Additionally, he referenced [REDACTED] making "countless preparations of anthrax spores." [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] In another point, IVINS called [REDACTED] an "internationally recognized authority on anthrax spores and their production and purification." [REDACTED]

Investigation on 11/16/2007 at Frederick, MD

File # 279A-WF-222936-[REDACTED]

92

Date dictated N/A

by SA
PI [REDACTED]

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279A-WF-222936-[redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of [redacted], On 11/16/2007, Page 2

[redacted]
A copy of the email was placed in an FD-340 and can be found in the file at 1A-7735.

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

b6
b7CDate of transcription 06/02/2008

On June 02, 2008, [REDACTED] social security account number [REDACTED] date of birth [REDACTED] provided the following information telephonically:

BRUCE IVINS called [REDACTED] on [REDACTED] [REDACTED] IVINS apologized to [REDACTED] again for his behavior, asking for [REDACTED] to forgive him. He informed [REDACTED] that as an outcome of him being away, he found out he was an alcoholic and drug addict. [REDACTED] was surprised because [REDACTED] was under the impression that he was away for mental health reasons. He also mentioned that he had periods of black outs in the past.

Investigation on 06/02/2008 at Washington, D.C. (telephonically)

File # 279A-WF-222936 [REDACTED] 93 Date dictated N/A

by SA [REDACTED]

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279A-WF-222936-[redacted]-94

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In April 2007, [redacted] date of birth
[redacted] social security account number [redacted] agreed to
provide email communications between [redacted] and BRUCE EDWARDS
IVINS.

[redacted]
[redacted] Emails from the date ranges of [redacted]
through [redacted] were enclosed in a FD-340, 1A-7789, and
submitted to the file.


wpd

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279A-WF-222936-[redacted]-99


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In April 2007, [redacted] date of birth [redacted], social security account number [redacted] agreed to provide email communications between [redacted] and BRUCE EDWARDS IVINS.

[redacted] Emails from the date ranges of [redacted] through [redacted] were enclosed in a FD-340, 1A-7973, and submitted to the file.



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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
FOIPA
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